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ARTICLES 
THE MYTH OF COMMON LAW CRIMES 
Carissa Byrne Hessick* 
Conventional wisdom tells us that, after the United States was founded, 
we replaced our system of common law crimes with criminal statutes 
and that this shift from common law to codification vindicated 
important rule-of-law values. But this origin story is false on both 
counts. The common law continues to play an important role in modern 
American criminal law, and to the extent that it has been displaced by 
statutes, our justice system has not improved. Criminal statutes 
regularly delegate questions about the scope of criminal law to 
prosecutors, and judges have failed to serve as a check on that power. 
As a consequence, the current system provides less notice, less 
accountability, less separation of powers, and more potential for abuse 
than the common law system. Thus, to the extent the statute has 
displaced common law, the shift is not a story of the triumph of the rule 
of law; it is instead a story of legislative excess, prosecutorial 
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supremacy, and judicial abdication. The conventional wisdom of 
criminal common law is not only false, but it also conceals the failings 
of our current criminal justice system.  
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INTRODUCTION 
As every American school child knows, legislatures write laws and 
courts interpret those laws. Perhaps nowhere else is that division of 
powers more scrupulously observed than in the criminal law. Legislatures 
determine what conduct is illegal, and courts interpret criminal laws when 
they arise in individual prosecutions. The idea that courts could play a 
role, let alone a primary role, in deciding what conduct should be 
criminalized is seen as antithetical to the rule of law.1 Indeed, the 
prevailing wisdom is, as Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch said during 
his recent confirmation hearing, that “judges would make pretty rotten 
legislators.”2 
 
1 See, e.g., Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 476 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating 
“the notion of a common-law crime is utterly anathema today”); see also Sanford H. Kadish 
et al., Criminal Law and Its Processes: Cases and Materials 145 (8th ed. 2007) (associating 
the power of “courts to create new common law crimes” with “the regimes of Nazi Germany 
and Soviet Russia”).  
2 U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Nomination of the Honorable Neil M. Gorsuch to Be 
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States (Day 2), 
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But this was not always the case. For more than half of our country’s 
history, judges played a central role in determining the substance of 
criminal law,3 just as they did for property law, torts, contracts, and 
essentially every other area of law in early America.4 They used the 
common law method to determine what conduct qualified as criminal and 
to identify facts that could serve as a defense to prosecution. Judges’ role 
in substantive law was not an American invention. The colonists brought 
the concept of common law with them from England, and English and 
American judges helped develop the basic legal principles that underlie 
modern American law—especially criminal law.5 The distinction 
between murder and manslaughter,6 the creation of self-defense and other 
affirmative defenses,7 and the idea of criminal intent8 all derive from the 
common law. These familiar criminal law concepts were not articulated 
by legislatures in statutes that judges merely interpreted; instead, judges 
identified and refined these concepts over time in the course of deciding 
various criminal cases. The concepts have since been enshrined in 
statutes, but their origins lie in common law. 
Conventional wisdom tells us that our current criminal justice system 
is a system entirely of statutes, rather than common law, and that the shift 




BW8-XKAY] (last visited Mar. 22, 2019) (quote beginning at 00:27:14).  
3 See 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 2.1, at 103 (2d ed. 2003) (noting that 
“the substantive criminal law began as common law for the most part, and only later became 
primarily statutory”). 
4 See Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the 
Making and Application of Law 341 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) 
(stating that “the American common law . . . historically has been the basic instrument of 
official regulation in the legal systems of all of the American states except Louisiana”); see 
generally Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 
2009) (1881).  
5 See Ford W. Hall, The Common Law: An Account of its Reception in the United States, 
4 Vand. L. Rev. 791, 791–92, 797–800 (1951).  
6 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books, 190–204 
(Tucker ed., Philadelphia, William Young Birch & Abraham Small 1803) (describing the 
differences between murder and manslaughter at common law). 
7 1 Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses § 11, at 63 n.1 (1984) (“Most of the defenses 
recognized today, and in some cases their precise formulation, have not changed in more than 
300 years.”). 
8 Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 974, 974 (1932) (“For hundreds of years 
the books have repeated with unbroken cadence that Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. 
‘There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind.’” (footnote omitted)). 
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positive development.9 Stripping judges of the power to shape substantive 
criminal law and placing that power exclusively with the legislature, we 
are told, provides more notice to individual citizens, ensures that 
decisions about criminal justice matters are subject to democratic 
accountability, appropriately separates government powers between 
branches, minimizes discretion that could lead to abuse, and increases 
uniformity and deterrence. In short, the shift from common law crimes to 
criminal statutes is ordinarily told as a story about the triumph of the rule 
of law. 
This Article pushes back against this narrative. It argues that, although 
statutes now play an important role in the criminal law, it is incorrect to 
characterize our system as purely statutory. The common law continues 
to play an important role in shaping the substance of criminal law. The 
Article identifies several instances of judges permitting criminal 
prosecutions in situations that are not directly authorized by a criminal 
statute, but rather are the result of judges expanding the law to encompass 
new types of disfavored behavior. Nor is the continued existence of 
criminal common law merely a result of overreaching on the part of 
judges. Legislatures clearly contemplate a continued role for the common 
law in shaping the substance of criminal law. Several state legislatures 
allow judges to create new common law crimes; some codes explicitly 
refer to the common law definition of crimes rather than codifying the 
scope of prohibited behavior; and legislatures across the country routinely 
enact criminal legislation with broad or uncertain terms, knowing full well 
that the precise scope of those laws will be determined through case-by-
case adjudication.  
Not only has codification failed to fully displace the criminal common 
law, but codification has also failed to vindicate rule-of-law values. That 
is because the shift away from common law crimes did not result in 
clearly worded prohibitions that reflect democratic preferences. Instead, 
legislatures have written imprecise and overly broad criminal laws with 
extremely harsh penalties. The harsh penalties ensure that most 
defendants will plea bargain, rather than risk trial. As a result, the true 
scope and meaning of criminal laws have been left to prosecutors, rather 
 
9 See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American History 63–65 
(1993) (presenting the shift from common law crimes to a system in which “all crimes, and 
their punishments, should be embodied in a single, clear, definitive code” as a necessary 
feature of “[a] republican criminal justice system” as compared to the “autocratic” criminal 
justice system of England); see also infra note 31 (collecting sources). 
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than judges. Prosecutors’ decisions about how to enforce criminal laws—
what some have called the real criminal law10—are shielded from public 
view, and they do not bind prosecutors in future cases. In contrast, 
common law crimes were the result of public decisions by judges with 
precedential value. Abandoning common law crimes in favor of statutes 
has resulted in less certainty, less transparency, and less accountability—
hardly a triumph of the rule of law. 
Despite its inaccuracy, the conventional wisdom against common law 
crimes is pervasive. It is found in many court opinions, it operates as a 
background assumption in many public discussions about the law, and it 
is taught in law schools across the country.11 The pervasiveness has 
pernicious effects. The myth of common law crimes tells us that statutory 
criminal law vindicates individual rights and promotes democracy, and 
thus that judges should not interfere with the political branches’ 
development of that law. This message reinforces the tendency of modern 
judges to take an extremely passive role in policing the legislature and the 
executive in criminal cases.12 But, in reality, substantive criminal law is 
badly in need of reform, and history tells us judges could play an 
important role.  
The Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes the conventional 
wisdom surrounding common law crimes. It identifies two separate 
claims. The first claim is descriptive—that, at present, the criminal law is 
entirely statutory. The legislature has sole and complete control over the 
 
10 See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Bordenkircher v. Hayes: Plea Bargaining and the Decline of 
the Rule of Law, in Criminal Procedure Stories 351, 378 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006) (“The 
real law, the ‘rules’ that determine who goes to prison and for how long, is not written in code 
books or case reports. Prosecutors . . . define it by the decisions they make when ordering off 
the menus their states’ legislatures have given them.”).  
11 What I am referring to as “conventional wisdom,” others have sometimes called a “canon” 
or a “canonical account”—that is, a way of thinking about an area of law that is widely shared 
by legal scholars and judges and that is deeply related to how that area of the law is taught. 
Katie R. Eyer, The Canon of Rational Basis Review, 93 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1317, 1318 & 
n.1 (2018); Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 825, 825–27 
(2004).  
12 See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 24 (2003) (plurality opinion) (noting that the 
Supreme Court’s “tradition of deferring” to legislatures “in making and implementing 
[criminal justice] policy decisions is longstanding”); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 
(5th Cir. 1965) (declaring that “the courts are not to interfere with the free exercise of the 
discretionary powers of the attorneys of the United States in their control over criminal 
prosecutions”); see also Shima Baradaran Baughman, Subconstitutional Checks, 92 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 1071, 1093–101 (2017) (describing how the courts have failed to act as an 
institutional check on the other branches in criminal cases). 
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substance of criminal law, and a defendant may not be convicted or 
punished unless her conduct falls squarely within the conduct defined as 
illegal in a criminal statute. The second claim is normative—that the shift 
from common law to codification has been an overwhelmingly positive 
development. Codification vindicates rule-of-law values by preserving 
the appropriate separation of powers, promoting democracy, and 
protecting individual rights. 
Part II challenges the descriptive claim. First, it notes that the 
abrogation of common law has not been universal. Some states still 
explicitly reserve for judges the power to create common law crimes. 
Some common law crimes have not been codified. And some crimes have 
only a nominal basis in the text of a criminal statute. After noting the ways 
in which the common law continues to play a formal role in American 
criminal law, Part II also documents how the shift to codification has not 
resulted in clearly delineated crimes. Legislatures often fail to define 
terms in their criminal statutes; and when they do, they routinely define 
criminal conduct using qualitative terms, such as whether a defendant’s 
conduct or beliefs were “unreasonable.” When legislatures draft statutes 
in this manner, they necessarily embrace the idea of criminal common 
law. Such standards require that criminal conduct be defined on a case-
by-case basis, and, to the extent that more precise legal standards develop 
over time, they do so as a result of judge-made law. 
Part III shifts from the descriptive to the normative. It challenges the 
normative claim of the virtues of codification. In the abstract, the shift 
from common law to codification promises a system in which everyone 
knows what conduct is prohibited and the punishment associated with that 
conduct, a system in which those choices are made by democratically 
elected legislatures, and a system in which the prohibitions are enforced 
uniformly by democratically accountable prosecutors. But as Part III 
explains, that is not the system that criminal-law codification has created. 
Legislators routinely pass statutes knowing that prosecutors will 
determine, on a case-by-case basis, what the statute means and against 
whom to enforce it. As a result, people are sometimes left to guess 
whether certain conduct is permitted or prohibited. They rarely know 
what punishment they will receive if they engage in illegal conduct. And 
everyone knows that our laws are not uniformly enforced. 
The failure of criminal codes to promote rule-of-law values no doubt 
has many causes. Language is necessarily limited in what it can express 
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clearly,13 and it is costly (if not impossible) for legislatures to foresee all 
of the innovative ways that would-be criminals can inflict harm and thus 
prohibit that behavior.14 This makes clearly worded and narrowly tailored 
criminal statutes unappealing to legislators. But at least some of the 
problems associated with codification are political, rather than technical. 
Legislators have incentives to pass more and more criminal laws to satisfy 
interest groups, react to the events of the day, and avoid appearing soft on 
crime.15 But drafting precise and non-duplicative legislation is time 
consuming and requires political consensus, which can be difficult to 
generate.16 As a result, modern legislatures enact statutes that are overly 
broad, that fail to clearly explain what conduct is prohibited and what 
conduct is permitted, and that regularly impose disproportionately harsh 
penalties. 
Our country is unlikely to return to a system of criminal common law, 
and this Article does not argue that it should. But it is important that we 
do not oversimplify the story about the shift from common law crimes to 
codification. The story is not only inaccurate, but it also papers over the 
serious defects of our current system of judicial passivity, legislative 
delegation, and prosecutorial supremacy. The rule of law has yet to 
triumph in the American criminal justice system, and we should not 
pretend otherwise. 
I. COMMON LAW AND CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 
The conventional wisdom in criminal law is that the substance of 
modern criminal law is purely statutory and that legislative control over 
criminal law is superior to judicial creation of criminal law through 
common law. This conventional wisdom can be unpacked into two 
separate claims—a descriptive claim and a normative claim. The 
descriptive claim is about the source of modern American criminal law: 
it is created by legislatures and enshrined by statutes, rather than created 
by judges through the common law process. The normative claim is that 
the shift from judicial criminal common law to legislative codification 
 
13 See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998) (noting that “most statutes are 
ambiguous to some degree”). 
14 See Ernst Freund, The Use of Indefinite Terms in Statutes, 30 Yale L.J. 437, 438 (1921). 
15 See Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of American 
Criminal Codes, 56 Hastings L.J. 633, 635–45 (2005).  
16 See Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 345, 
351, 353.  
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vindicated rule-of-law values. In particular, it is better at providing 
defendants notice, it is more democratic, it better maintains the separation 
of powers, it minimizes discretion that has the potential for abuse, and it 
is more effective at achieving uniformity and deterrence.  
The descriptive claim—that modern criminal law is determined by 
legislatures and enshrined in statutes, rather than created by judges 
through the common law process—can be found in numerous court 
opinions.17 In United States v. Wiltberger, for example, the U.S. Supreme 
Court noted “the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in 
the legislative, not in the judicial department. It is the legislature, not the 
Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.”18  
The view that criminal law is created by statute, rather than common 
law, is also widely accepted—and taught—in American law schools. 
Indeed, several criminal law professors have argued that, because modern 
criminal law is statutory rather than common law, it is irrational to 
continue to teach the course using the case method rather than statutes.19 
But even those textbooks that continue to teach criminal law using cases, 
 
17 See, e.g., Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 381 (1989) (noting that “the substantive power 
to define crimes and prescribe punishments” lies with “the legislative branch of government”); 
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985) (“The definition of the elements of a 
criminal offense is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal crimes, which 
are solely creatures of statute.”); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (“[L]egis-
latures and not courts should define criminal activity.”); see also Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 
U.S. 451, 476 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating “the notion of a common-law crime is 
utterly anathema today”); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 152 (1945) (Roberts, J., 
dissenting) (“It cannot be too often emphasized that as basic a difference as any between our 
notions of law and those of legal systems not founded on Anglo-American conceptions of 
liberty is that crimes must be defined by the legislature.”).  
18 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820).  
19 See, e.g., Neil P. Cohen, Teaching Criminal Law: Curing the Disconnect, 48 St. Louis U. 
L.J. 1195, 1197, 1200–01 (2004) (“The modern truth is that criminal law today is statutory 
law. Anyone who practices criminal law must be able to read, understand, and apply statutes, 
some of which are complex and poorly written. This fact alone justifies using the Criminal 
Law course to teach statutory analysis to first-year students.” (footnote omitted)); Markus D. 
Dubber, Criminal Law in Comparative Context, 56 J. Legal Educ. 433, 436, 442 (2006) 
(“[C]riminal law in the United States can no longer be regarded as a common law subject. The 
monolith of ‘common law’ . . . has been thoroughly and irrevocably replaced by a set of fifty-
two independent and comprehensive systems of criminal law, with their own criminal codes 
and corresponding bodies of jurisprudence interpreting these codes.”); Kevin C. McMunigal, 
A Statutory Approach to Criminal Law, 48 St. Louis U. L.J. 1285, 1285, 1289 (2004) 
(discussing how criminal law “has not been a true common law subject for many years. . . . As 
a result of the nineteenth century codification movement, every American state has for decades 
accepted the notion of legislative supremacy in Criminal Law—the idea that legislators rather 
than judges should create and define criminal offenses.” (footnote omitted)). 
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rather than statutes, state that “the reach of the criminal law is determined 
solely by the reach of statutory language.”20  
Many students are introduced to this idea through the so-called 
principle of legality, which includes the idea “‘[n]ullum crimen, nulla 
poena, sine lege’ (‘There is no crime without law, no punishment without 
law’).”21 Most modern criminal law textbooks include a section on the 
principle of legality.22 The principle of legality includes not only a 
prohibition on common law crimes, but also prohibitions on ex post facto 
criminal laws and on overly vague criminal statutes.23 Although there is 
some disagreement about the precise scope of the legality principle,24 
there is widespread agreement that the principle requires the “advance 
 
20 See, e.g., Kadish et al., supra note 1, at 138; see also Joshua Dressler & Stephen P. Garvey, 
Cases and Materials on Criminal Law 92 (6th ed. 2012) (“[A] person may not be convicted 
and punished unless her conduct was defined as criminal (today, in the United States, by 
statute rather than by judges).”). 
21 Richard G. Singer & John Q. La Fond, Criminal Law 8 (4th ed. 2007); see also Leo Katz 
et al., Foundations of Criminal Law 215–16 (1999) (equating the notions of legality, “nulla 
poena sine lege (no punishment without law),” and the “doctrine denying courts the power to 
make conduct criminal by common law decision”); Jerome Hall, Nulla Poena Sine Lege, 47 
Yale L.J. 165, 165 (1937) (identifying, as one meaning for the phrase nulla poena sine lege, 
the idea that “no person shall be punished except in pursuance of a statute which fixes a penalty 
for criminal behavior”). 
22 See, e.g., Richard J. Bonnie et al., Criminal Law 80–112 (2d ed. 2004); Dressler & 
Garvey, supra note 20, at 92–119; Jerome Hall et al., Cases and Readings on Criminal Law 
and Procedure 3–72 (3d ed. 1976); Phillip E. Johnson, Criminal Law: Cases, Materials and 
Text 75–97 (3d ed. 1985); Kadish et al., supra note 1, at 134–67; Sanford H. Kadish et al., 
Criminal Law and Its Processes: Cases and Materials 350–70 (4th ed. 1983); John Kaplan et 
al., Criminal Law: Cases and Materials 130–43 (5th ed. 2004); Katz et al., supra note 21, at 
208–18.  Some casebooks describe the principle without necessarily using the term “legality.” 
Arnold H. Loewy, Criminal Law: Cases and Materials 799–832 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing the 
principle as “fair notice”); Jens David Ohlin, Criminal Law: Doctrine, Application, and 
Practice 85–111 (2016) (discussing a “written statute requirement”); Singer & La Fond, supra 
note 21, at 5–11 (discussing limits of criminal law, including legality). Interestingly, older 
textbooks and treatises tend not to include such a section. See, e.g., Joel Prentiss Bishop, 
Commentaries on the Law of Statutory Crimes (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1873) (not 
discussing legality); George E. Dix & M. Michael Sharlot, Criminal Law: Cases and Materials 
162–71 (2d ed. 1979) (not including a section on legality, but noting a “requirement of 
precision”); Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Cases and Materials on Criminal Law and 
Procedure (6th ed. 1984) (not discussing the principle of legality or suggesting that there is 
any problem with the creation of common law crimes).  
23 See Hall, supra note 22, at 30–65 (discussing ex post facto criminal laws); Kadish et al., 
supra note 1, at 136 (same). 
24 See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, Act and Crime: The Philosophy of Action and Its 
Implications for Criminal Law 239–42 (1993) (arguing that the principle of legality is 
comprised of four separate values and nine different doctrines, and thus that it is a misnomer 
to refer to as a single principle). 
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legislative specification of criminal conduct”25 and that it prohibits 
common law crime creation by judges.26 The principle of legality and the 
prohibition on common law crimes are sometimes couched in purely 
descriptive terms—namely that legislatures, rather than judges, determine 
the scope of criminal law in modern times.27 But some sources claim that 
judicial crime creation is prohibited by law.28 And other sources claim 
that the prevailing view is the product of shared values.29 
The very phrase “principle of legality” helps to underscore the 
normative aspect of the conventional wisdom—after all, principles are not 
merely rules, but rules that profess to contain some sort of truth.30 The 
normative claim is that rule-of-law values require statutes to be the 
exclusive source of substantive criminal law.31 Many tie the principle of 
 
25 Bonnie et al., supra note 22, at 85 (emphasis omitted). 
26 Hall, supra note 21, at 167–68 (stating that it was the influence of Parliament and the rise 
of legislation that transformed “nulla poena into some real approximation to the rule”). 
27 See, e.g., Bonnie et al., supra note 22, at 88 (stating that “judicial crime creation is 
increasingly hard to find,” identifying Commonwealth v. Mochan, 110 A.2d 788 (Pa. 1955) as 
the “most nearly modern example” of the practice, and attributing the decline of judicial crime 
creation, in part, to the accumulation of penal statutes over time); Gabriel J. Chin & Wesley 
M. Oliver, Experiencing Criminal Law 7 (2015) (including a section titled “Criminal Law Is 
Statutory”); 1 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Law § 10, at 37–38 (15th ed. 1993) (“It 
is for the legislative branch of a state or the federal government to determine, within state or 
federal constitutional limits, the kind of conduct which shall constitute a crime and the nature 
and extent of punishment which may be imposed therefor.”). 
28 See, e.g., Dix & Sharlot, supra note 22, at 172 (“Crimes are generally—and perhaps 
constitutionally must be—statutory.”); Katz et al., supra note 21, at 215–16 (referencing the 
“doctrine denying courts the power to make conduct criminal by common law decision”); 
Ohlin, supra note 22, at 86 (including a section entitled “The Written Statute Requirement” 
and stating that “appellate courts enforce the prohibition against prosecuting an old common 
law crime that was not carried over and codified in statute”); Singer & La Fond, supra note 
21, at 8 (“Today, a defendant cannot be convicted of a crime unless the legislature has enacted 
in advance a statutory definition of the offense.”). 
29 Bonnie et al., supra note 22, at 88 (attributing the decline of criminal common law, in 
part, “to the consensus that judicial crime creation is in principle unacceptable”); Johnson, 
supra note 22, at 75 (“[W]e insist that criminal prohibitions and penalties be enacted by a 
legislature and applied only prospectively.”). 
30 Principle, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 
Unabridged (2002) (defining “principle” as, inter alia, “a general or fundamental truth”). 
31 See, e.g., Hall et al., supra note 22, at 3 (“The ‘rule of law’ has been regarded as the 
greatest political achievement of our culture, and the relevant principle of legality has 
maximum significance in the criminal law because the most basic values are involved.”); 
Kadish et al., supra note 1, at 145 (characterizing the power of “courts to create new common 
law crimes” as allowing courts to “create new crimes, not within the ambit of any existing 
statute, to reach situations that are considered analogous to ones already covered. The doctrine 
of criminal law by analogy is often associated with the regimes of Nazi Germany and Soviet 
Russia”); Hall, supra note 21, at 183 (suggesting that the legality principle is a feature that 
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legality to the European Enlightenment,32 whose ideas helped spark the 
American Revolution and formed the basis of our Constitution.33 And 
several have stated that the principle is the first or foundational principle 
of American criminal law.34 
The criminal-law literature does more than merely state, in general 
terms, that criminal statutes are necessary to justify convictions and 
punishment.35 It also identifies particular values that are better served by 
criminal statutes than by criminal common law: notice, separation of 
powers, democratic accountability, prevention of government abuse, and 
increasing uniformity and deterrence.  
The primary objection to common law crimes is an objection about 
notice.36 Common law crimes create notice problems because the 
 
distinguishes “liberal states” from “autocracy”); Kathryn Preyer, Jurisdiction to Punish: 
Federal Authority, Federalism and the Common Law of Crimes in the Early Republic, 4 L. & 
Hist. Rev. 223, 263 (1986) (“[C]ommon law jurisdiction to punish was a doctrine to be feared. 
Its potential reach threatened the liberties of citizens and the polity of each and every state.”); 
Ben Rosenberg, The Growth of Federal Criminal Common Law, 29 Am. J. Crim. L. 193, 194 
(2002) (“Common law crimes . . . run afoul of our deepest notions of due process and raise 
the specter of the judiciary imposing its will and the coercive powers of the state against its 
citizens.”). 
32 See, e.g., Bonnie et al., supra note 22, at 85–86; Stanislaw Pomorski, American Common 
Law and the Principle of Nullum Crimen Sine Lege 11–12 (1975); Hall, supra note 21, at 165, 
168–70; John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 
71 Va. L. Rev. 189, 190 (1985). But see Jerome Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 20–
27 (1947) (tracing the origins of the principle of legality not only to the French Revolution, 
but also to Rome and the Magna Carta).  
33 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography 243 (2005) (stating 
that a “general commitment to Enlightenment values (slavery aside) pulsated through the 
Constitution”); Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 27 
(1967) (noting the prevalence of quotations of Enlightenment thought in the colonies leading 
up to the Revolution); Suzanna Sherry, The Sleep of Reason, 84 Geo. L.J. 453, 465–69 (1996) 
(explaining that “our Constitution is in fact a thoroughly Enlightenment document”). 
34 E.g., Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 79–80 (1968) (“The first 
principle, we are repeatedly told, is that conduct may not be treated as criminal unless it has 
been so defined by an authority having the institutional competence to do so before it has taken 
place.”); Hall, supra note 21, at 184 (stating that the principle of legality “represents the most 
cherished of all the values involved in the administration of the criminal law”). 
35 See, e.g., Singer & La Fond, supra note 21, at 7–8 (discussing the principle of nulla poene 
as a means to providing fair notice); Note, Common Law Crimes in the United States, 47 
Colum. L. Rev. 1332, 1337 (1947) [hereinafter Note, Common Law Crimes] (same). 
36 See Loewy, supra note 22, at 799 (“One of the most basic notions of criminal law is that 
before the crime is committed, the defendant have fair notice that her conduct will be deemed 
criminal.”); Ohlin, supra note 22, at 85 (identifying the “central vision of the criminal law” as 
the principle “that defendants should only be condemned if they had fair warning about the 
law’s requirements but disobeyed it anyway”); Rosenberg, supra note 31, at 197 (identifying 
“the problem of notice” as a reason to prohibit common law crimes); Note, Common Law 
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boundary between legal and illegal behavior is not set forth in a written 
statute, but rather evolves and changes over time through the course of 
individual adjudications. Because a new legal rule can be announced and 
applied to a defendant in the same case, the common law process can 
result in convictions for conduct that was not clearly forbidden at the time 
the defendant acted.37 Without notice, people might either accidentally 
engage in illegal behavior, or they might forgo legal behavior because 
they are uncertain whether it is permitted.38 This notice objection is 
grounded in due process concerns.39 
Another objection to common law crimes is that they are anti-
democratic. Common law crimes are determined by judges, who are not 
accountable to voters through elections. The current system of written 
statutes is democratic, so the objection goes, because the statutes are 
written by legislators who are elected and thus democratically 
accountable.40 This democratic accountability objection is part of a larger 
argument that public policy should be set by the political branches, not by 
the judiciary.41 
 
Crimes, supra note 35, at 1337 (identifying “fair warning” as a reason to codify criminal law, 
rather than rely on criminal common law). 
37 See Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law (pt. 1), 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1003, 1061 
(1985) [hereinafter Jay, Part One] (noting “the association of judicial lawmaking with ex post 
facto legislation”). 
38 See Singer & La Fond, supra note 21, at 7. 
39 See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572–73 (1974); Rosenberg, supra note 31, at 
197; see also Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Procedural Rights at Sentencing, 
90 Notre Dame L. Rev. 187, 209–10 (2014) (tracing this requirement of ex ante notice to the 
Due Process Clause). 
40 See Bonnie et al., supra note 22, at 86 (“As the branch of government most directly 
responsive to the popular will, the legislature had the power to define crimes. Judges were to 
enforce statutes, not to make law.”); Moore, supra note 24, at 240 (“The primary value 
furthered by [the prohibition against common law crimes] is democracy, because the 
justification for restricting criminal law-making to legislatures is largely due to the more 
democratic selection of legislatures over judges.”); Roscoe Pound, Common Law and 
Legislation, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 383, 406 (1908) (stating that, as compared to common law, 
“legislation is the more truly democratic form of law-making”).  
41 E.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (“[B]ecause of the seriousness of 
criminal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral 
condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity.”); 
see also Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts 
Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1995) (stating that the “ubiquitous 
web of statutes, combined with more political concerns about ‘judicial activism,’ may have in 
fact caused state judges to feel that our role as common-law judges, cautiously and creatively 
developing the law in ways appropriate to a changing society, has been circumscribed” 
(footnote omitted)); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. 
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The separation of powers has also been used to justify a prohibition on 
common law crimes.42 The Constitution vests “[a]ll legislative Powers” 
in Congress, and it vests the “judicial Power of the United States” in the 
Supreme Court and lower federal courts.43 The power to legislate includes 
the power to decide which conduct is legal and which conduct is illegal—
that is, the power to write criminal laws.44 The judicial power, on the other 
hand, is understood to include only the power to interpret criminal laws 
as they arise in individual cases and to enter judgments in those cases.45 
This division of authority between branches, so the argument goes, is not 
only commanded by the text of the Constitution, but it also serves to 
protect individual rights. Dividing governmental powers between 
different branches helps to check government power and preserve 
liberty.46 
Relatedly, statutes are thought to do a better job than common law in 
limiting the discretion of government officials and preventing abuse.47 As 
Professor John Jeffries explains this argument, common law authority 
creates the risk “that judicial particularization of the broad rubrics of 
common-law authority will be too ‘subjective,’ too closely grounded in 
the facts of the case at hand, insufficiently abstracted from the personal 
characteristics of the individual defendant.”48 In other words, because 
they make the decision whether certain conduct is a crime in the context 
of a particular case, judges may make those decisions on the basis of a 
defendant’s race, religion, or other inappropriate factors. In contrast, 
statutes are generally applicable. While they may be inspired by a 
particular crime or set of crimes, the legislature’s decision whether to 
 
Chi. L. Rev. 1, 24 (1985) (noting “the principle that public policy should be made by officials 
who are answerable to the people through periodic elections”). 
42 E.g., Michael Manning, Comment, A Common Law Crime Analysis of Pinkerton v. 
United States: Sixty Years of Impermissible Judicially-Created Criminal Liability, 67 Mont. 
L. Rev. 89, 107–08 (2006); see also Kadish et al., supra note 1, at 135–36 (directing students 
to consider the dissent in Commonwealth v. Mochan, 110 A.2d 788 (Pa. 1955), to consider 
whether “the legality principle reflect[s] important separation-of-powers values in addition to 
those protected by requiring prospectivity and clarity”). 
43 U.S. Const. art. I, § 1; U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. 
44 See, e.g., McMunigal, supra note 19, at 1287 (“The dominant attitude expressed in 
American jurisdictions is one of legislative supremacy and exclusivity [in criminal law].”). 
45 Bonnie et al., supra note 22, at 86. 
46 Merrill, supra note 41, at 19. 
47 See, e.g., Kadish et al., supra note 1, at 136; Singer & La Fond, supra note 21, at 7; Paul 
H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
335, 341 (2005); Note, Common Law Crimes, supra note 35, at 1337. 
48 Jeffries, supra note 32, at 214. 
COPYRIGHT © 2019 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 
978 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 105:965 
classify particular conduct as criminal is always forward-looking and 
applies to all members of society. 
Finally, some have argued that criminal statutes are better at achieving 
uniformity and deterrence than are common law crimes. Unlike statutes, 
common law crimes have not been reduced to a specific, defined set of 
circumstances. Without specificity, judges cannot ensure that they are 
making decisions consistent with other judges,49 and individuals cannot 
know what behavior to avoid.50 In contrast, statutes clearly articulate 
which conduct is forbidden and which is not, thus ensuring that judges 
will convict and acquit for the same conduct and defendants will know 
which conduct to avoid. 
II. COMMON LAW’S ENDURING ROLE IN MODERN CRIMINAL LAW 
The descriptive claim underlying the conventional wisdom—that 
modern criminal law is purely statutory—is not accurate. To be sure, 
statutes have supplanted common law as the primary source of American 
criminal law,51 but that does not mean the common law has been entirely 
displaced.52 To the contrary, common law continues to play an explicit 
and implicit role in the substance of criminal law. 
Judicial crime creation is still explicitly permitted in several states. And 
even in those jurisdictions that have abrogated criminal common law, we 
can find criminal prosecutions that can only be explained in terms of 
judicial crime creation. What is more, legislatures appear to have 
implicitly embraced common law crimes. Legislatures routinely fail to 
define statutory terms, and they rely on qualitative standards that 
 
49 See Robinson, supra note 47, at 341 (“[T]he lack of a precise statutory definition leaves 
rules subject to interpretation. This is likely to reduce the uniformity in application, as different 
judges use, or decline to use, common law doctrines.”).  
50 See Singer & La Fond, supra note 21, at 8 (“Providing prior notice of illegality by statute 
also supports the reasons for convicting and punishing lawbreakers. Utilitarians would 
concede that, before deterrence can be effective, an individual must be able to know what 
conduct is forbidden and the consequences of breaking the law.”); Hall, supra note 21, at 170 
(citing Feuerbach for the idea that the principle of legality allows for “deterrence by threat”); 
Robinson, supra note 47, at 340 (arguing that, because common law crimes are “generally 
unknown to the public,” they cannot “deter future offenders through fear of punishment”). 
51 See, e.g., Note, Common Law Crimes, supra note 35, at 1334 (“[A]n examination of the 
cases shows that the great majority of prosecutions under the common law are for petty 
matters, and that statutory preemption of the major and more common offenses has been fairly 
complete.”). 
52 See, e.g., Kaye, supra note 41, at 18 (“Vital though the common law still may be, I think 
it inarguable that it has been surpassed as the preeminent source of law it once was.”).  
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necessarily require decisions about the scope of criminal law to be made 
on a case-by-case basis.53 That is to say, legislatures write statutes that 
delegate their lawmaking authority; the scope of those statutes can only 
be determined as a matter of criminal common law.  
Before critiquing the conventional wisdom about criminal common 
law, it is first necessary to acknowledge that the terms “common law 
crimes” and “criminal common law”54 have both been used to refer to two 
distinct but related concepts.55 Sometimes the terms are used to refer to 
substantive criminal law—usually the body of law that was brought from 
England to the colonies, where it served as the basis of the law enforced 
in early American courts.56 Sometimes the terms are used to refer to the 
authority of judges to convict in the absence of a written statute. 
Importantly, these two meanings are not always distinct. When discussing 
the authority of judges to convict in the absence of a statute, many assume 
that authority is limited to situations that fall within the body of 
substantive criminal laws imported from England. 
A. The Common Law’s Formal Role in Modern Criminal Law 
In the early years of the United States, judges regularly convicted in 
the absence of statutes and exercised their power to recognize new 
crimes.57 Although the Supreme Court prohibited federal common law 
crimes in United States v. Hudson & Goodwin,58 common law 
 
53 See Freund, supra note 14, at 437 (“It is possible to distinguish roughly three grades of 
certainty in the language of statutes of general operation: precisely measured terms, 
abstractions of common certainty, and terms involving an appeal to judgment or a question of 
degree.”).  
54 This Article uses the terms “common law crimes” and “criminal common law” 
interchangeably. 
55 See Pomorski, supra note 32, at 2–3 (noting the different meanings of the term “common 
law”). 
56 But sometimes it refers to the idea that certain acts are forbidden by “natural law.” Natural 
law is the idea that legal principles are derived “from a universalized conception of human 
nature or divine justice rather than from legislative or judicial action.” Natural Law, Black’s 
Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). The idea that legal principles derived from natural law was 
once widely accepted, but has since fallen out of fashion. See generally Stuart Banner, When 
Christianity Was Part of the Common Law, 16 L. & Hist. Rev. 27, 49–60 (1998) (describing 
the shift in attitudes towards common law, namely a shift from perceiving common law as the 
natural law discovered by judges to perceiving that common law is judge-made law).  
57 1 Life and Letters of Joseph Story 298 (W. Story ed., Boston 1851); see also infra notes 
211–216.  
58 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (holding that the “exercise of criminal jurisdiction in 
common law cases” is “not within the[] implied powers” of the federal courts). 
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prosecutions persisted in the states long after.59 At the same time that state 
courts exercised common law authority, state legislatures also enacted 
criminal statutes. But their enactment of statutes was not novel, nor did it 
supplant common law authority.60  
It was not until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that 
statutes became the primary source of substantive criminal law in most 
states. As their criminal codes grew, several states enacted statutes that 
explicitly deprived judges of common law authority.61 And even when the 
legislature did not explicitly abolish common law crimes, judges in some 
states held that the code abolished common law crimes by implication.62  
But the rejection of common law crimes occurred slowly, and it has not 
been complete. By 1947, only eighteen states had “abolished” common 
law crimes.63 By 1976, that number had risen to twenty-seven.64 To this 
day, more than a dozen states expressly retain a role for common law 
 
59 See 1 LaFave, supra note 3, § 2.1(c), at 106–07; Jeffries, supra note 32, at 192–93; Pound, 
supra note 40, at 403; Rosenberg, supra note 31, at 199. 
60 Into the twentieth century, the common law, in most states, continued to serve “as a 
reservoir of substantive law to stop up the holes left by the legislatures, ‘ready to be called 
into activity whenever the occasion may require.’” Note, Common Law Crimes, supra note 
35, at 1334–35 (quoting State v. E. Coal Co., 70 A. 1, 5 (R.I. 1908)). And some states expressly 
adopted the common law as a matter of statute or constitutional provision. See Herbert Pope, 
The English Common Law in the United States, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 6, 25 (1910) (“In some states 
the common law as it existed down to the time of the Revolution is declared, either by a 
constitutional or statutory provision, to be in force.” (footnote omitted)).  
61 See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-103 (LexisNexis 2018) (“All common law offenses and 
affirmative defenses are abolished.”); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-104(3) (2018) (“Common-law 
crimes are abolished and no conduct shall constitute an offense unless it is described as an 
offense in this code or in another statute of this state . . . .”); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 500.020(1) 
(LexisNexis 2014) (“Common law offenses are abolished and no act or omission shall 
constitute a criminal offense unless designated a crime or violation under this code or another 
statute of this state.”); Minn. Stat. § 609.015 (2016) (“Common law crimes are abolished and 
no act or omission is a crime unless made so by this chapter or by other applicable 
statute . . . .”); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:1-5(a) (West 2018) (“Common law crimes are abolished 
and no conduct constitutes an offense unless the offense is defined by this code or another 
statute of this State.”); Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-105 (LexisNexis 2017) (“Common law crimes 
are abolished and no conduct is a crime unless made so by this code, other applicable statute 
or ordinance.”); see also 1 LaFave, supra note 3, § 2.1(c), at 107 n.19 (collecting sources). 
62 See, e.g., Estes v. Carter, 10 Iowa 400, 401 (1860); see also 1 LaFave, supra note 3, 
§ 2.1(c), at 106. 
63 Note, Common Law Crimes, supra note 35, at 1332; Hart & Sacks, supra note 4, at 513–
14.  
64 Hall et al., supra note 22, at 3 n.* (“Today at least 27 states either expressly or by implica-
tion have ‘abolished’ common law crimes.”). 
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crimes: Alabama,65 Connecticut,66 the District of Columbia,67 Florida,68 
Idaho,69 Maryland,70 Michigan,71 Mississippi,72 New Mexico,73 North 
 
65 Ala. Code § 1-3-1 (LexisNexis 1999) (“The common law of England, so far as it is not 
inconsistent with the Constitution, laws and institutions of this state, shall, together with such 
institutions and laws, be the rule of decisions, and shall continue in force . . . .”); see also 
Tucker v. State, 168 So. 2d 258, 260 (Ala. Ct. App. 1964) (“[C]ommon-law jurisdiction cannot 
‘be exercised as to purely statutory offenses, nor in cases of common-law offenses for which 
punishment is prescribed by statute. Hence it can only exist as to common-law offenses, for 
which common-law punishment only can be inflicted.’” (quoting State v. Gillilan, 41 S.E. 131, 
133 (W. Va. 1902) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
66 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-4 (2017) (“The provisions of this chapter shall not be construed 
as precluding any court from recognizing other principles of criminal liability or other 
defenses not inconsistent with such provisions.”). 
67 D.C. Code § 45-401(a) (2001) (“The common law, all British statutes in force in Maryland 
on February 27, 1801, the principles of equity and admiralty, all general acts of Congress not 
locally inapplicable in the District of Columbia, and all acts of Congress by their terms 
applicable to the District of Columbia and to other places under the jurisdiction of the United 
States, in force in the District of Columbia on March 3, 1901, shall remain in force except 
insofar as the same are inconsistent with, or are replaced by, some provision of the 1901 
Code.”). 
68 Fla. Stat. § 775.01 (2018) (“The common law of England in relation to crimes, except so 
far as the same relates to the modes and degrees of punishment, shall be of full force in this 
state where there is no existing provision by statute on the subject.”).  
69 Idaho Code Ann. § 18-303 (West 2016) (“All offenses recognized by the common law as 
crimes and not herein enumerated are punishable, in case of felony, by imprisonment in the 
state prison for a term not less than one (1) year nor more than five (5) years; and in case of 
misdemeanors, by imprisonment in the county jail for a term not exceeding six (6) months or 
less than one (1) month, or by fine not exceeding $500, or both such fine and imprisonment.”).  
70 See 7 M.L.E. Criminal Law § 3 (2019) (“The common law in relation to crimes is in force 
except insofar as it has been abrogated by statute. Even where a statute has been enacted 
covering a crime, the common law is still applicable if the statute was not intended to cover 
the entire field or to repeal the common law.” (footnotes omitted)). 
71 Mich. Comp. Laws Serv. § 750.505 (LexisNexis 2017) (“Any person who shall commit 
any indictable offense at the common law, for the punishment of which no provision is 
expressly made by any statute of this state, shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by 
imprisonment in the state prison not more than 5 years or by a fine of not more than 
$10,000.00, or both in the discretion of the court.”). 
72 Miss. Code. Ann. § 99-1-3 (2015) (“Every offense not provided for by the statutes of this 
state shall be indictable as heretofore at common law.”). 
73 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-1-3 (West 2016) (“In criminal cases where no provision of this code 
is applicable, the common law, as recognized by the United States and the several states of the 
Union, shall govern.”). 
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Carolina,74 North Dakota,75 Rhode Island,76 South Carolina,77 Virginia,78 
and Washington79 all recognize the common law authority of judges to 
convict for conduct that is not criminalized by statute. 
In those jurisdictions where judges retain common law authority to 
convict in the absence of a statute, they ordinarily use that authority to 
convict for the same discrete group of uncodified crimes. For example, 
judges in Maryland routinely convict defendants for the common law 
offense of indecent exposure.80 And judges in North Carolina routinely 
convict defendants for robbery, despite the fact that there is no statute 
defining robbery as a criminal offense.81 It is less common, but not 
unheard of, for courts to use their common law authority to convict for a 
crime that had never before been recognized in the jurisdiction.82 For 
example, in 1967, a New Mexico appellate court upheld a conviction for 
the common law misdemeanor of “indecent handling of a dead body,” 
despite the fact that there was no statute prohibiting the conduct and 
despite the fact that there had never before been a conviction for such 
 
74 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-288.3 (2017) (“All other provisions of the Article are intended to be 
supplementary and additional to the common law and other statutes of this State and, except 
as specifically indicated, shall not be construed to abrogate, abolish, or supplant other 
provisions of law.”). 
75 N.D. Cent. Code § 1-01-03(7) (2016) (“The will of the sovereign power is expressed 
by . . . [t]he decisions of the tribunals enforcing those rules, which, though not enacted, form 
what is known as customary or common law.”). 
76 11 R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-1-1 (2002) (“Every act and omission which is an offense at 
common law, and for which no punishment is prescribed by the general laws, may be 
prosecuted and punished as an offense at common law.”). 
77 S.C. Code Ann. § 16-1-110 (2015) (“A felony or misdemeanor provided by statute or in 
common law which is not assigned a classification pursuant to Section 16-1-90 or 16-1-100 
must be punished as provided before enactment of the classification system.”). 
78 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-16 (2014) (“A common-law offense, for which punishment is 
prescribed by statute, shall be punished only in the mode so prescribed.”). 
79 Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.060 (2016) (“The provisions of the common law relating to the 
commission of crime and the punishment thereof, insofar as not inconsistent with the 
Constitution and statutes of this state, shall supplement all penal statutes of this state and all 
persons offending against the same shall be tried in the courts of this state having jurisdiction 
of the offense.”). 
80 See, e.g., Genies v. State, 43 A.3d 1007, 1010–11, 1013 (Md. 2012); Wisneski v. State, 
921 A.2d 273, 279–80 (Md. 2007). 
81 See, e.g., State v. Bates, 330 S.E.2d 200, 201 (N.C. 1985); State v. Black, 209 S.E.2d 458, 
460 (N.C. 1974). 
82 See Hart & Sacks, supra note 4, at 514 (noting that “the process of defining new types of 
conduct as criminal appears to have come to a virtual stop”).  
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behavior in the state.83 More recently, the Supreme Court of Mississippi 
relied on the fact that suicide was unlawful at common law to uphold a 
conviction for manslaughter.84 The defendant had argued that he had 
accidentally shot the victim during the course of an unsuccessful suicide 
attempt, and he requested that the jury be given an instruction on accident. 
But the state countered with the argument, which the Mississippi Supreme 
Court accepted, that Mississippi had, by statute, incorporated common 
law crimes, and that suicide was unlawful at common law.85 Notably, in 
agreeing with the state that “[s]uicide is a common law offense,” the court 
did not cite any Mississippi cases on the matter; it relied only on cases 
from other jurisdictions.86 
Even in those jurisdictions that explicitly prohibit judicial crime 
creation, we nonetheless see convictions that cannot possibly be 
explained as anything else.87 Take, for example, the scores of federal 
convictions for insider trading. The Supreme Court tells us that “Section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s Rule 10b-5 prohibit undisclosed trading on 
inside corporate information by individuals who are under a duty of trust 
and confidence that prohibits them from secretly using such information 
for their personal advantage.”88 But neither of these sources actually 
addresses trading on inside corporate information. Section 10(b) prohibits 
the use, “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security,” of “any 
manipulative or deceptive device.”89 And Rule 10b-5 forbids the use, “in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security,” of “any device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud.”90 Insider trading does not appear to be 
manipulative, deceptive, or fraudulent because a person who is engaged 
in insider trading is not making any affirmatively misleading statements; 
 
83 State v. Hartzler, 433 P.2d 231, 233–35 (N.M. Ct. App. 1967). The court relied on a 
handful of cases from other states and several criminal law treatises to conclude that the 
conduct constituted a common law crime. 
84 Nicholson ex rel. Gollott v. State, 672 So. 2d 744 (Miss. 1996). 
85 Id. at 753. 
86 Id. at 753 & n.2.  
87 “Rulings that, while purporting to be interpretations of statutes, criminalize acts that were 
never contemplated by Congress are more accurately thought of as rulings that create federal 
criminal common law than as interpretations of the statutes themselves.” Rosenberg, supra 
note 31, at 211. 
88 Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 423 (2016). 
89 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881, 891 (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)). 
90 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5. 
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they are merely buying or selling stock without making any representation 
about why they are engaging in the transaction.91 
The Supreme Court has dealt with this problem by concluding that 
insiders have a fiduciary obligation to the shareholders of a corporation.92 
According to the Court, this fiduciary duty creates a duty for the insider 
to either disclose their information or abstain from trading; otherwise 
insiders would be able to take unfair advantage of uninformed 
stockholders.93 Alternatively, the Court has theorized that the fiduciary 
duty means that the insider “misappropriates confidential information for 
securities trading purposes.”94 Interpreting the statute and regulation as 
prohibiting insider trading is desirable, the Court tells us, because it 
protects the securities markets and enhances investor confidence.95 
These are perfectly good explanations why insiders ought to be 
forbidden from trading on their insider information. But they are not 
particularly good explanations as to why insider trading necessarily falls 
within the generic prohibitions on deceptive practices or fraudulent 
schemes found in the relevant statute and regulation.96 And they are very 
 
91 As Professor Donna Nagy has explained, “the common law generally imposed liability 
for affirmative misstatements. Fraud by silence was actionable only in limited circumstances, 
and the default rule was one of caveat emptor.” Thus, the “challenge in prosecuting insider 
trading as a violation of Rule 10b-5 thus turns on characterizing a defendant’s silence as a 
fraud.” Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94 
Iowa L. Rev. 1315, 1323 (2009). In order for an insider’s silence to be considered fraudulent, 
“the insider trader must be under some type of obligation to speak.” Id. 
92 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (finding “a relationship of trust and 
confidence [exists] between the shareholders of a corporation and those insiders who have 
obtained confidential information by reason of their position with that corporation”). 
93 Id. at 228–29. This is sometimes referred to as the “traditional” or “classical theory” of 
insider trading liability. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997). 
94 This is sometimes referred to as the “misappropriation theory”: 
The “misappropriation theory” holds that a person commits fraud “in connection 
with” a securities transaction, and thereby violates § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, when he 
misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a 
duty owed to the source of the information. Under this theory, a fiduciary’s undisclosed, 
self-serving use of a principal’s information to purchase or sell securities, in breach of 
a duty of loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that 
information. In lieu of premising liability on a fiduciary relationship between company 
insider and purchaser or seller of the company’s stock, the misappropriation theory 
premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader’s deception of those who entrusted him 
with access to confidential information. 
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652 (citation omitted). 
95 See, e.g., id. at 653, 658. 
96 Commentators have long argued that neither the statute nor the regulation reach insider 
trading. E.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the 
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poor explanations of how these generic statutory and regulatory 
prohibitions put the public on notice that insider trading is a crime. 
Federal liability for the substantive crimes of co-conspirators provides 
another example. There is no federal statute that allows for the conviction 
of individuals for the crimes of their co-conspirators. But in Pinkerton v. 
United States,97 the Supreme Court held that one conspirator can be 
convicted for the crimes committed by another. Daniel and Walter 
Pinkerton were indicted for both conspiracy and several completed 
crimes. Daniel did not commit the substantive crimes (he had been 
incarcerated when Walter committed them),98 but the Supreme Court 
nonetheless affirmed his convictions. No federal statute created this 
criminal liability,99 nor is this type of liability recognized at common 
law;100 the Pinkerton Court created it out of whole cloth. The Court 
affirmed Daniel’s convictions because it believed punishment in these 
circumstances made sense. The Court reasoned that conspirators were like 
 
Federal Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1189, 1192 (1995) (“[T]he 
insider trading prohibition is a species of federal common law.”); Michael P. Dooley, 
Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1, 59 (1980) (stating that insider 
trading litigation in the courts has exceeded the authority granted by the 1934 Act); Saikrishna 
Prakash, Our Dysfunctional Insider Trading Regime, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1491, 1497–98 
(1999) (“Rather than endorsing specific legislation that would make the use of material, non-
public information illegal in appropriate circumstances, the SEC arguably manipulated a 
statute and a regulation that bar deceptions in order to curb informational advantages.”). And 
the SEC appears to have thought the same until the 1950s. See Prakash, supra, at 1498 n.18 
(“During the 1950s, the SEC openly acknowledged that it lacked the authority to regulate 
insider trading through rule 10b-5.”). 
97 328 U.S. 640 (1946). 
98 The majority conceded that there was “no evidence to show that Daniel participated 
directly in the commission of the substantive offenses on which his conviction has been 
sustained.” Id. at 645. The dissent explained why: 
The proof showed that Walter alone committed the substantive crimes. There was none 
to establish that Daniel participated in them, aided and abetted Walter in committing 
them, or knew that he had done so. Daniel in fact was in the penitentiary, under sentence 
for other crimes, when some of Walter’s crimes were done. 
Id. at 648 (Rutledge, J., dissenting in part). 
99 See Alex Kreit, Vicarious Criminal Liability and the Constitutional Dimensions of 
Pinkerton, 57 Am. U. L. Rev. 585, 596 (2008) (“To this day, the Pinkerton ‘elements’ are 
nowhere to be found in the federal criminal code . . . .”); Manning, supra note 42, at 110 (“A 
search of the United States Code will reveal no statute prescribing that a conspirator may be 
held criminally responsible for the substantive offenses of his or her co-conspirators.”); see 
also Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 649 (Rutledge, J., dissenting in part) (“I think this ruling violates 
both the letter and the spirit [of the statute] . . . .”). 
100 Manning, supra note 42, at 117 (noting that the rule in Pinkerton “violates the long-
standing principle of conspiracy law that conspiracy is an offense separate and distinct from 
the substantive offense”). 
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business partners and that, because the relevant federal conspiracy statute 
permitted the overt act of one conspirator to satisfy the overt act 
requirement for all, “the same or other acts in furtherance of the 
conspiracy are likewise . . . attributable to the others for the purpose of 
holding them responsible for the substantive offense.”101 Put simply, the 
Court found criminal liability despite the absence of any supporting 
statutory language or legislative history.102  
Judicial recognition of crimes with only tenuous connections to statutes 
is not only a federal phenomenon. California’s felony murder law 
provides an example from the states. California law specifically states that 
no person can be convicted or punished for conduct unless it is prohibited 
by statute.103 And yet the California Supreme Court has admitted that its 
second-degree felony murder rule is a judicial, rather than a statutory, 
creation.104 The court has defended the crime from separation of powers 
challenges on the theory that the doctrine is an interpretation of the 
statutory term “implied malice” that is supported by common law 
principles.105 But the argument that “implied malice” necessarily includes 
an unintentional killing committed during the course of any dangerous 
felony defies any rational textual analysis,106 especially in light of the fact 
 
101 Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647. 
102 See United States v. Long, 301 F.3d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The Pinkerton doctrine 
is a judicially-created rule that makes a conspirator criminally liable for the substantive 
offenses committed by a co-conspirator when they are reasonably foreseeable and committed 
in furtherance of the conspiracy.”); Kreit, supra note 99, at 596 (“[T]he Pinkerton majority 
appears to have created an entirely new basis for criminal liability out of statutory thin air, 
arguably in violation of the prohibition against creation of federal common law crimes.”); 
Manning, supra note 42, at 110 (“The Pinkerton theory is clearly a common law doctrine and 
not statutory in nature.”). 
103 Cal. Penal Code § 6 (West 2019) (“No act or omission, commenced after twelve o’clock 
noon of the day on which this Code takes effect as a law, is criminal or punishable, except as 
prescribed or authorized by this Code, or by some of the statutes which it specifies as 
continuing in force . . . .”). 
104 People v. Robertson, 95 P.3d 872, 878 (Cal. 2004) (“The first degree felony-murder rule 
is a creation of statute. (§ 189.) The second degree felony-murder rule is a common law 
doctrine.”). 
105 See People v. Sarun Chun, 203 P.3d 425, 431–34 (Cal. 2009). 
106 See id. at 452–53 (Moreno, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“We . . . possess 
the authority to abrogate the second degree felony-murder doctrine because ‘the second degree 
felony-murder rule remains, as it has been since 1872, a judge-made doctrine without any 
express basis in the Penal Code.’” (quoting Robertson, 95 P.3d at 884 (Moreno, J., 
concurring))). 
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that a separate statute criminalizes unintentional killings that occur during 
the course of specific, enumerated felonies.107 
B. Legislatures’ Tacit Embrace of Criminal Common Law 
Criminal common law is often presented as an issue of judicial versus 
legislative control over the scope of criminal law. But legislatures 
sometimes write statutes that explicitly embrace the common law. And 
legislatures routinely implicitly embrace the common law when they fail 
to clearly delineate the scope of criminal law. Those statutes delegate 
crime definition to judges,108 and thus necessarily incorporate common 
law both as a substantive source of criminal law and as a process for 
determining the scope of that law.109 
Several states have enacted statutes that incorporate common law 
definitions. Sometimes this incorporation is crime-specific, such as the 
North Carolina burglary and arson statutes, which do not articulate 
elements for the crimes, but rather prohibit conduct “as defined at the 
common law.”110 But sometimes the incorporation is wholesale. For 
example, a number of states that prohibit common law crimes nonetheless 
include a catch-all statutory provision explicitly permitting the use of 
common law to interpret statutes.111 Kansas and Nevada go even further, 
requiring courts to use the common law to interpret statutory terms that 
are not defined.112  
Legislatures also implicitly incorporate the common law into their 
criminal codes whenever they fail to define statutory terms. Because 
 
107 Cal. Penal Code § 189 (West 2019). 
108 See Kahan, supra note 16, at 353. 
109 See generally Rosenberg, supra note 31 (discussing federal criminal common law as both 
a body of law and a process).  
110 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51 (2017) (burglary); id. § 14-58 (arson). 
111 E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-104(3) (2018) (permitting “the use of case law as an 
interpretive aid in the construction of the provisions of this code”); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.015 
(2016) (permitting “the use of common law rules in the construction or interpretation” of 
criminal statutes). 
112 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5103(a) (2017) (“[W]here a crime is denounced by any statute of 
this state, but not defined, the definition of such crime at common law shall be applied.”); 
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 193.050(3) (LexisNexis 2012) (“The provisions of the common law 
relating to the definition of public offenses apply to any public offense which is so prohibited 
but is not defined, or which is so prohibited but is incompletely defined.”). Both of these states 
make criminal statutes, as opposed to the common law, the sole source of criminal 
prohibitions. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5103(a) (2017); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 193.050(1) 
(LexisNexis 2012). 
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courts will ordinarily assume that the legislature is writing its statutes 
against the backdrop of the common law,113 a decision not to define a 
term—especially a term around which a body of common law has 
developed, is essentially a decision to incorporate that body of common 
law.114 
Sometimes, however, there is no clearly established common law 
definition of a term. When legislatures fail to define statutory terms that 
do not have an established common law meaning, then they are not simply 
incorporating the historical common law meaning; instead they are 
delegating the meaning of that term to the judiciary.115 Put differently, the 
legislature is, to some extent, delegating to judges the task of deciding 
what conduct should be legal and what conduct should be illegal. And it 
is inevitable that, in making that decision, the judges’ decision will result 
in a type of common law.116  
 
113 E.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21 (1999) (“It is a well-established rule of 
construction that ‘[w]here Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning 
under . . . the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that 
Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of these terms.’” (alterations in 
original) (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992))); Astoria 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (stating that “where a common-
law principle is well established, . . . the courts may take it as given that Congress has 
legislated with an expectation that the principle will apply” (citations omitted)); Standard Oil 
Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59 (1911) (“[W]here words are employed in a statute 
which had at the time a well-known meaning at common law or in the law of this country they 
are presumed to have been used in that sense”); People v. Hall, 388 P.3d 794, 798 (Cal. 2017) 
(“[C]ourts construe criminal statutes against the backdrop of the common law presumption 
that scienter is required and imply the requisite mental state, even where the statute is silent.”); 
People v. Reeves, 528 N.W.2d 160, 164 (Mich. 1995) (“‘[W]ords and phrases that have 
acquired a unique meaning at common law are interpreted as having the same meaning when 
used in statutes dealing with the same subject’ matter as that with which they were associated 
at the common law.” (alteration in the original) (quoting Pulver v. Dundee Cement Co., 515 
N.W.2d 728, 732 (Mich. 1994))); see also Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Herbert Wechsler, The Federal 
Courts and the Federal System 435 (1953) (stating that “a state legislature acts against the 
background of the common law, assumed to govern unless changed by legislation”); Jay, Part 
One, supra note 37, at 1006 (identifying the previous statement from Hart and Wechsler as the 
“standard account of state law”). 
114 See Pomorski, supra note 32, at 75–78. 
115 See Kahan, supra note 16, at 353–54; Kaye, supra note 41, at 25, 28.  
116 See Rosenberg, supra note 31, at 202–07 (identifying several examples of federal 
criminal common law); see also Gary D. Rowe, The Sound of Silence: United States v. Hudson 
& Goodwin, The Jeffersonian Ascendancy, and the Abolition of Federal Common Law 
Crimes, 101 Yale L.J. 919, 925 n.29 (1992) (“The current version of federal common law 
(‘new’ federal common law . . .) involves filling gaps in otherwise comprehensive cong-
ressional statutory schemes.” (citing Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New 
Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383 (1964))). 
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One example of such a wholesale delegation occurred in a federal 
statute aimed at corruption. In the mid-twentieth century, prosecutors 
began using the federal mail fraud statute to obtain convictions for 
government corruption.117 That statute prohibits “any scheme or artifice 
to defraud, or for obtaining money or property” that uses the mails or 
causes them to be used.118 Because the statute could be read to prohibit 
not only fraudulent schemes to obtain money or property, but also other 
fraudulent schemes, prosecutors argued—and lower courts agreed—that 
corrupt government officials fraudulently deprived their constituents of 
their “intangible right” to “honest services” and thus could be convicted 
under this statute.119 After declining to address the issue for decades,120 
the Supreme Court rejected this interpretation of the mail fraud statute in 
McNally v. United States.121 The McNally Court acknowledged that the 
statute could be read to include frauds that obtained more than simply 
money or property,122 but it relied on legislative history and the rule of 
lenity to read the statute more narrowly.123 In rejecting the idea that the 
mail fraud statute reached government corruption, the McNally Court 
stated that “[i]f Congress desires to go further, it must speak more clearly 
than it has.”124  
Congress responded quickly, enacting 18 U.S.C. § 1346, which states 
that, for purposes of mail and wire fraud “the term ‘scheme or artifice to 
defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible 
right of honest services.”125 The statute did not define the term “intangible 
right of honest services,” and the only legislative history for the statute 
 
117 Lisa Kern Griffin, The Federal Common Law Crime of Corruption, 89 N.C. L. Rev. 
1815, 1820 (2011) (noting that these prosecutions began in the 1940s and increased in 
frequency in the 1970s). 
118 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012). 
119 See, e.g., United States v. Clapps, 732 F.2d 1148, 1153 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v. 
Von Barta, 635 F.2d 999, 1005–07 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998 (1981); United 
States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1362 (4th Cir. 1979), aff’d in relevant part, 602 F.2d 653, 
654 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980); United States v. Keane, 522 
F.2d 534, 549 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976); United States v. States, 488 
F.2d 761, 766–67 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974); Shushan v. United States, 
117 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941). 
120 See supra note 119 (collecting cases).  
121 483 U.S. 350, 361 (1987). 
122 Id. at 358. 
123 Id. at 357–60, 357 n.7. 
124 Id. at 360. 
125 Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (1988) (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 1346). 
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indicated that it was enacted “to overturn McNally and restore the broad 
definition of fraud that had evolved prior to that decision.”126 Although 
the Supreme Court ultimately opted to construe the statute narrowly in 
order to avoid constitutional concerns,127 Section 1346 represents a 
significant delegation and ratification of common law powers. Not only 
did Congress fail to define what was meant by the phrase “intangible right 
of honest services,”128 but the circumstances surrounding the passage of 
Section 1346 obviously also conveyed Congress’s approval of the lower 
courts’ decision to use their common law authority to decide which 
actions ought to be illegal.129  
The Sherman Act’s prohibition on restraints of trade provides another 
example of wholesale delegation. The statute prohibits any “contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint 
of trade or commerce.”130 During the congressional debates surrounding 
the Sherman Act, the bill’s proponents insisted that they were creating a 
way for federal officials to enforce common law prohibitions of 
conspiracies in restraints of trade. But the common law doctrine in that 
area was quite obviously unsettled.131 The cases decided since the passage 
of the statute have confirmed that Congress essentially delegated to the 
federal courts the task of creating a criminal common law of antitrust.132 
Indeed, soon after the statute’s passage, Professor Roscoe Pound used it 
as proof that “lawyers in the legislature often conceive it more expedient 
 
126 Griffin, supra note 117, at 1821 & n.29 (collecting sources). 
127 Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 408–12 (2010).  
128 See Griffin, supra note 117, at 1822 (“Codifying the expansion of fraud liability to cases 
of ‘intangible’ rights violations thus did nothing at all to clarify how far the statute ultimately 
extends.”).  
129 See Rosenberg, supra note 31, at 203–05 (identifying honest services fraud as proof that 
federal common law crimes exist). 
130 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
131 Arthur M. Allen, Criminal Conspiracies in Restraint of Trade at Common Law, 23 Harv. 
L. Rev. 531, 534–43 (1910); Donald Dewey, The Common-Law Background of Antitrust 
Policy, 41 Va. L. Rev. 759, 759, 762–85 (1955); Freund, supra note 14, at 441. 
132 See, e.g., Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359–60 (1933) 
(characterizing the Sherman Act as having “a generality and adaptability comparable to that 
found to be desirable in constitutional provisions,” stating that because the statute “does not 
go into detailed definitions which might either work injury to legitimate enterprise or through 
particularization defeat its purposes by providing loopholes for escape,” and noting that the 
Act’s “general phrases, interpreted to attain its fundamental objects, set up the essential 
standard of reasonableness”); see also Freund, supra note 14, at 440–41 (noting that the 
statutory language has given rise to differing interpretations, which “made the criminality of 
acts dependent upon matter of degree and of opinion”). 
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to make of a statute the barest outline, leaving details of the most vital 
importance to be filled in by judicial law-making.”133  
Failing to define statutory terms is not the only way in which 
legislatures delegate the scope of criminal law to the courts. Sometimes 
legislatures write criminal statutes that are designed to distinguish 
between legal and illegal conduct on a case-by-case basis.134 Legislatures 
do this whenever they write statutes that include a qualitative standard, 
such as whether the defendant’s conduct was “unreasonable.”135 Every 
jurisdiction in this country has at least one criminal statute that employs 
such a standard.136 Those standards essentially fail to give any guidance 
about how they will be applied, leaving people uncertain whether their 
conduct will be deemed unreasonable by judges or juries.137 
Criminal statutes that employ flexible standards rather than clear 
prohibitions are routinely tolerated by the courts. As Justice Holmes once 
said: 
[T]he law is full of instances where a man’s fate depends on his 
estimating rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some 
matter of degree. If his judgment is wrong, not only may he incur a fine 
or a short imprisonment, as here; he may incur the penalty of death.138  
As recently as 2015, the Supreme Court reaffirmed “the constitutionality 
of laws that call for the application of a qualitative standard such as 
‘substantial risk’ to real-world conduct.”139 Not only do these flexible 
standards require case-by-case determinations, but, as explained more 
fully in the next Part, because of other features of the modern criminal 
 
133 Pound, supra note 40, at 383. 
134 See Freund, supra note 14, at 437 (noting that legislatures sometimes write statutes using 
“terms involving an appeal to judgment or a question of degree”). 
135 The rules-versus-standards debate is a mainstay in both legal education and legal 
scholarship. When using the terms “rules” and “standards,” I do so against the backdrop of 
Professor Louis Kaplow’s observation that “the only distinction between rules and standards 
is the extent to which efforts to give content to the law are undertaken before or after 
individuals act.” Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke 
L.J. 557, 560 (1992) (emphasis omitted). 
136 See Appendix to Supplemental Brief of United States at 1a–99a, Johnson v. United 
States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (No. 13-7120) (collecting federal criminal statutes and state 
criminal statutes that employ qualitative standards).  
137 See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick, Vagueness Principles, 48 Ariz. St. L.J. 1137, 1146 
(2016) (explaining how the qualitative standards in child neglect statutes fail to give parents 
and caregivers sufficient notice about what conduct is criminal). 
138 Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913).  
139 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2561 (2015). 
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justice system, those determinations are often no longer made by judges. 
Instead they are made by prosecutors and, as a result, they pose even 
greater rule-of-law problems than do common law crimes. 
III. THE NORMATIVE FAILURE OF CODIFICATION 
Conventional wisdom tells us that the shift from common law to 
codification vindicated the rule of law.140 This normative claim is 
premised on the assumption that codification ensures clearly worded 
criminal prohibitions that are fairly enforced. As the previous Section 
explains, however, legislatures often fail to clearly define crimes when 
they enact statutes. Because the power to interpret laws is given to courts, 
one would expect that a failure to define crimes is essentially a delegation 
of lawmaking power to judges.141 But in practice that power is usually 
exercised by prosecutors rather than judges. Because prosecutors have 
overwhelming leverage to induce guilty pleas and unfettered enforcement 
discretion, they largely determine the scope of modern criminal law. 
Prosecutors’ decisions about the scope of criminal law do not bind them 
in future cases, and they are often shielded from the general public.  
This delegation of criminal law power to prosecutors reintroduces the 
very flaws that the shift from common law crimes to codification was 
supposed to cure. In a very real sense, the current criminal justice system 
gives less notice, ensures less stringent separation of powers, provides 
fewer limitations on government discretion and abuse, and is less 
effective at ensuring uniformity and deterrence than a system of common 
law crimes. And while the delegation of criminal law substance to 
prosecutors may, in some jurisdictions, provide more democratic 
accountability than a system of common law crimes, that accountability 
is more apparent than real. In short, the rule of law has not been vindicated 
by the shift from common law crimes to codification—those values are 
routinely subverted by our current system.  
A. Codification and the Rise of Prosecutors 
When we speak of criminal statutes, we often assume that the statute is 
written in specific rather than general terms, and we also assume that the 
 
140 See supra note 31.  
141 See Kahan, supra note 16, at 353–54. Indeed, the previous Section referred to legislative 
failure to define statutory terms as a tacit embrace of criminal common law. See supra text 
accompanying notes 113–116.  
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statutes are written to target only particular harmful behavior. But statutes 
frequently do not live up to this ideal. Language is imprecise, and so 
legislators may not be able to clearly communicate what activity should 
be prohibited and which permitted. Carefully crafted laws require 
significant time and effort, and both are often in short supply when 
legislatures are in session. In addition to the time and effort required, 
legislatures have several additional disincentives to enact precise laws. 
Precise laws create a risk that would-be wrongdoers will circumvent 
them.142 Precise laws are more likely to be rendered obsolete by 
technology or other changed circumstances, and updating laws can be 
both time-consuming and expensive.  
Political concerns may also encourage legislators to vote for broad, 
imprecise statutes. Legislators may find it more difficult to agree on the 
content of a precise law, than on a more general principle. In addition, 
there are few incentives for legislators to write narrow, precise laws. For 
non-criminal laws, legislatures must balance the preferences of 
competing interest groups. But for criminal laws, with the exception of 
white-collar offenses, all of the powerful interest groups favor broader 
criminal laws and harsher punishments.143 Even without the prompting of 
interest groups, legislators will sometimes propose legislation to expand 
the scope of criminal laws in order to respond to a news story.144 Those 
legislators who vote against increasing the scope of criminal laws risk 
being labeled “soft on crime.”145 Indeed, the “soft on crime” label is so 
 
142 See generally Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1491 
(2008) (arguing that overly broad laws may, in some circumstances, be beneficial because 
they allow the state to punish those who adapt their behavior to legal regimes). 
143 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow & Kathleen M. O’Neill, Delegating Punitive Power: The 
Political Economy of Sentencing Commission and Guideline Formation, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 
1973, 1982–83 (2006) (“Legislators can reap political rewards by increasing penalties without 
worrying about angering any powerful interest group or alienating the public.”). 
144 Robinson & Cahill, supra note 15, at 644; see also Jessica A. Roth, Alternative Elements, 
59 UCLA L. Rev. 170, 178 (2011). 
145 As Paul Robinson and Michael Cahill explain: 
Criminal law proposals, however useless or even ridiculous they may be, typically 
pass because legislators share a common reluctance to appear “soft on crime.” When a 
new and unnecessary specific offense, such as “library theft,” is proposed, the issue 
becomes a referendum on whether legislators care about public libraries, not on whether 
the proposed legislation will actually do anything to combat the problem of theft or will 
instead have pernicious ramifications for the application of the criminal code’s general 
theft provision. As a result, the rational legislator is likely to vote in favor of the library-
theft bill because there is a clear constituency—library users, and taxpayers generally—
COPYRIGHT © 2019 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 
994 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 105:965 
toxic that interest groups seeking to advance non-criminal law interests 
have targeted state judges who are opposed to those interests in their 
reelection campaigns by running ads about their defense-friendly 
rulings.146 
But these surface politics are not the only forces that drive broad 
statutes and harsh punishments. The institutional relationship between 
legislatures and law enforcement does as well. As Professor Bill Stuntz 
explained in some detail, legislatures and prosecutors have cooperated to 
increase the substance and penalties of criminal law. They have done so 
in order to ensure that prosecutors are more likely to obtain convictions 
and that they can do so relatively inexpensively—i.e., through plea 
bargains rather than through trials.147 This dynamic has led legislatures to 
pass laws that are both more broad than they think is appropriate and more 
harsh than they think is just.148 Such laws allow prosecutors to pressure 
defendants to plea bargain.149 And, to the extent that voters worry that 
certain conduct ought not be illegal or that certain penalties are too high, 
legislators will reassure them that the laws are meant to make convictions 
of the truly culpable more certain and less expensive—in other words, 
they will tell their constituents that they do not expect prosecutors to 
enforce the law as written.150 
 
that will benefit from its enactment, and no constituency to complain about the new 
provision’s more subtle and diffuse drawbacks. 
Robinson & Cahill, supra note 15, at 644–45; see also William J. Stuntz, The Pathological 
Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505, 509 (2001) (“[B]oth major parties have 
participated in a kind of bidding war to see who can appropriate the label ‘tough on crime.’”). 
146 See Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The People’s Courts: Pursuing Judicial Independence 
in America 1–3 (2012) (collecting recent incidents); Kaye, supra note 41, at 14 n.74 (collecting 
incidents from the 1980s and 1990s). 
147 See Stuntz, supra note 145, at 529–33; see also Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design 
and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 869, 880 
(2009) (noting that Congress “now legislates with precisely this framework of prosecutorial 
power over pleas in mind”). 
148 Russell M. Gold et al., Civilizing Criminal Settlements, 97 B.U. L. Rev. 1607, 1617 
(2017). 
149 Stuntz, supra note 145, at 531. 
150 See Barkow, supra note 147, at 875 (“In theory, federal prosecutors stand as the 
gatekeepers to ensure that these laws are properly applied and are used judiciously. That is, 
prosecutors working in United States Attorneys’ Offices should ensure that no matter how 
broadly a criminal statute is worded, it is not applied except in those instances where a 
defendant is actually blameworthy. These prosecutors should also make sure that a law is not 
applied to a given case if the punishment dictated by the law would be excessive.”); Josh 
Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 
Colum. L. Rev. 1655, 1664 (2010) (“It is necessary and desirable for prosecutors to exercise 
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These practical, political, and institutional considerations have resulted 
in imprecise, overly broad, and overly harsh criminal laws.151 Ordinarily, 
broad or imprecise laws delegate power to judges to determine the scope 
of the law. But when it comes to criminal law, that power is delegated 
almost exclusively to prosecutors. Plea bargaining is one reason that 
prosecutors largely determine the scope of criminal law.152 Because most 
criminal cases are resolved by plea bargaining, rather than by trial, 
ambiguous statutory terms are far more often interpreted by prosecutors 
than by judges. Legislatures have purposely given prosecutors great 
leverage in plea negotiations by enacting statutes with harsh sentences. 
The only way for defendants to avoid disproportionately harsh sentences 
is to forgo legal challenges to prosecutorial charging and to plead guilty 
even when they have a plausible argument that their behavior did not fall 
within a proper interpretation of the statute. As a result, defendants are 
often convicted without a judge deciding whether their actions fell within 
the imprecisely worded statute.153 
Leverage during plea bargaining is not the only way that legislatures 
have delegated power over the scope of criminal law to prosecutors. 
When legislatures enact overly broad laws—that is, laws that reach 
beyond the conduct that the legislature meant to prohibit and include less 
blameworthy (or even innocuous) behavior154—they know that 
 
a measure of discretion because codes are too expansive to do otherwise.”); Gold et al., supra 
note 148, at 1618 & n.32 (providing an example of a U.S. senator opposing legislation to 
reduce drug sentences on the theory that new legislation was not needed “because prosecutors 
were not seeking those penalties in all cases” and because prosecutors could use the 
disproportionately harsh sentences “as leverage to obtain guilty pleas”). 
151 See Rosenberg, supra note 31, at 213 (noting “the almost exponential growth in the 
number and breadth of federal criminal statutes.”); Roth, supra note 144, at 172 (“Federal 
criminal law . . . has been derided for being disorganized, vague, incomprehensible, and 
seemingly boundless.”); Stuntz, supra note 145, at 512–23 (documenting criminal law’s 
breadth and depth).  
152 See Baughman, supra note 12, at 1095. 
153 See infra text accompanying notes 254–256; see also Gold et al., supra note 148, at 1626–
28 (discussing how plea bargaining dynamics lead to “legally innocent” defendants pleading 
guilty). 
154 See Buell, supra note 142, at 1493 (noting that most critiques of overly broad laws focus 
on statutes that “extend[] criminal sanctions beyond culpable actors who pose a genuine risk 
to others”); Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing 
Process, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 904, 909–10 (1962) (identifying the phenomenon of 
“overcriminalization,” namely, the proliferation of “criminal statutes which seem deliberately 
to overcriminalize, in the sense of encompassing conduct not the target of legislative 
concern”); see also Bowers, supra note 150, at 1678 (“A criminal is normatively innocent 
where his conduct is undeserving of communal condemnation, even if it is contrary to law.”). 
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prosecutors are unlikely to enforce the statute as broadly as written. But 
it is entirely up to prosecutors to decide how broadly or narrowly to 
enforce those laws. In other words, prosecutors are free to decide which 
conduct to treat as illegal and which to treat as permissible. 155 
Importantly, the decisions that prosecutors make about the scope of 
criminal law are largely shielded from public view.156 Only if a case goes 
to trial will a prosecutor have to argue why she believes that the 
defendant’s behavior fell within the relevant statutory language. If the 
defendant pleads guilty, then the judge is never asked to rule upon the 
meaning of the statute, and the prosecutor need not disclose her 
interpretation of the statute. But the charges that a prosecutor chooses to 
bring are only one piece of evidence about how the prosecutor interprets 
and enforces the law. The charges that a prosecutor chooses not to bring 
give significant information about how a prosecutor interprets an 
ambiguous statute,157 and they also tell us how a prosecutor has decided 
to enforce an overly broad statute. But the public rarely learns about the 
cases a prosecutor does not litigate. Thus, although prosecutors largely 
determine the scope of modern criminal law, those determinations are not 
visible to the public. 
B. Rule-of-Law Values Revisited  
The conventional wisdom assumes that criminal statutes are better than 
criminal common law at vindicating rule-of-law values. But, as the 
previous Section explains, our current system is not a system of precisely 
written statutes that target only particular harmful behavior. Our system 
 
155 Barkow, supra note 147, at 871 (noting that prosecutors “are the final adjudicators in the 
vast majority of cases”). 
156 See Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, 86 Wash. L. Rev. 69, 78 
(2011). 
157 A prosecutor’s decisions about when not to charge are as important as their decisions 
about when to bring charges for determining the scope for the criminal law as enforced by the 
prosecutor. 
Even where there is strong evidence that a particular defendant’s conduct falls within 
the letter of a criminal prohibition, a prosecutor might nonetheless decline to bring 
charges for any number of reasons. A prosecutor will sometimes fail to charge where a 
defendant is particularly sympathetic, or when a prosecutor thinks a defendant’s 
conduct is not sufficiently blameworthy even if technically criminal. Prosecutors 
occasionally decline to charge due to fundamental disagreement with substantive law 
or discomfort with the severity of the likely penalty. 
Daniel Epps, Adversarial Asymmetry in the Criminal Process, 91 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 762, 778 
(2016) (footnotes omitted). 
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of imprecisely defined crimes, broadly written statutes, and overly harsh 
punishments empowers prosecutors to make ad hoc and low-visibility 
decisions about the scope of criminal law. This current system fails to 
vindicate rule-of-law values and, in some instances, is less compatible 
with those values than the criminal common law. 
1. Notice 
The notice objection to common law crimes is that, because the 
boundary between legal and illegal behavior is not set forth in a written 
statute, the scope of the criminal law evolves and changes over time 
through the course of individual adjudications.158 Because a change to a 
common law crime can be announced and applied to a defendant in the 
same case, a defendant can be convicted for conduct that was not clearly 
forbidden at the time the defendant acted.159 
The modern criminal justice system can also result in convictions for 
conduct that was not clearly forbidden at the time the defendant acted.160 
Take, for example, a statute that forbids “unreasonable” conduct. The 
statute does not specify what conduct is reasonable and what conduct is 
unreasonable. The reasonableness—and thus the criminality—of conduct 
is decided only after a defendant has acted. Because individuals cannot 
know how prosecutors will judge the reasonableness of their actions, they 
lack notice about whether their conduct will be considered criminal.161 Of 
course, when charges involving statutes with such qualitative standards 
are brought to trial, the jury serves as a check on prosecutors’ legal 
judgment about what conduct should be criminalized. But juror 
judgments about qualitative standards are even less predictable and less 
easily discovered than prosecutors’ judgments.162 
Statutes with undefined terms also fail to give notice. Take, for 
example, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) 
 
158 See supra notes 36–39. 
159 See Jay, Part One, supra note 37, at 1061 (noting “the association of judicial lawmaking 
with ex post facto legislation”). 
160 See Freund, supra note 14, at 444 (hinting at the irony that so many “indefinite terms” 
are included in statutes given that “the strong demand for codification of the criminal 
law . . . was largely inspired by the general abhorrence of undefined offenses”). 
161 As Ernst Freund noted, statutes that use qualitative terms “fail to differentiate adequately 
either the province of morals or of social restraint from the province of law, or the province of 
the unlawful from that of the legitimate and even valuable.” Id. at 438. 
162 What is more, because the vast majority of criminal cases result in plea bargains rather 
than trials, the jury does not provide this check in most cases. 
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statute—a law adopted to help combat organized crime. Congress made 
it a federal crime for individuals to invest money obtained through a 
“pattern” of criminal activity in an “enterprise,” to acquire an interest in 
an “enterprise” through a “pattern” of criminal activity, or to conduct the 
affairs of an “enterprise” through a “pattern” of criminal activity.163 There 
is no common law understanding of the terms “enterprise” or “pattern,” 
and Congress did not provide a particularly helpful definition of the 
terms.164 As a result, the federal reporters are full of cases that attempt to 
give some coherent meaning to these terms.165 And because statutory 
interpretation decisions are generally thought to apply to defendants who 
acted before a decision was announced,166 leaving it to courts to define 
statutory terms means that defendants may act without having notice 
whether their conduct is legal or illegal. 
Overly broad statutes fail to provide notice too. When legislators pass 
laws that sweep in more conduct than is necessary to prevent a particular 
harm, they do not expect the law to be enforced in all circumstances that 
fall within the text of the statute. But rather than identifying when 
enforcement would be appropriate and when it would be inappropriate, 
they leave it to prosecutors to decide what circumstances will trigger 
prosecution. In other words, they leave it to prosecutors to decide what 
conduct is, as a matter of practice, illegal.  
 
163 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2012). 
164 Congress defined “enterprise” to “include[] any individual, partnership, corporation, 
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact 
although not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2012). While it may be obvious whether an 
entity is a corporation or a partnership, it is entirely unclear what it means for a group of 
individuals to be “associated in fact.” 
Congress defined “pattern” of criminal activity to mean “at least two acts . . . one of which 
occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years 
(excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1961(5) (2012). If two acts were all that was required to form a pattern, one imagines that 
Congress would have said “two or more.” By using the phrase “at least two,” Congress 
ostensibly meant that while two acts are necessary, they may not be sufficient to qualify as a 
“pattern.” See H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 237–38 (1989). 
165 See Norman Abrams et al., Federal Criminal Law and Its Enforcement 598–619, 651–65 
(5th ed. 2010) (collecting cases). 
166 See Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312–13 (1994); see also Hall, supra 
note 21, at 171 (noting that “all case law—and that includes jurisprudence interpretative of 
statutes or codes—operates retroactively”); Leah M. Litman & Shakeer Rahman, What Lurks 
Below Beckles, 111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 555, 579 (2017) (noting that “decisions of statutory 
interpretation reflect what a statute meant when it was enacted”). 
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Importantly, the public often knows—or at least suspects—that broad 
statutes will not be enforced as written. This is communicated to the 
public every time a challenge to an overly broad statute is met with the 
justification that broad language is needed in order to provide “flexibility” 
to prosecutors.167 But the public does not know how prosecutors will 
choose to enforce these overly broad laws, and thus they do not have 
notice about the scope of criminal law.168 Needless to say, prosecutors 
rarely explain under what circumstances they will enforce criminal law 
and under what circumstances they will decline to enforce.169 And even 
when such circumstances are made public, defendants whose conduct 
falls outside of that interpretation often have no recourse if a prosecutor 
decides to abandon that interpretation in her particular case.170  
The notice problems created by qualitative standards, undefined terms, 
and overly broad laws are more significant than the notice problems 
 
167 See, e.g., Abram Olchyk, A Spoof of Justice: Double Jeopardy Implications for 
Convictions of Both Spoofing and Commodities Fraud for the Same Transaction, 65 Am. U. 
L. Rev. 239, 270 (2015) (recounting that a federal statute addressing commodities fraud was 
written to include “catch-all” language of “all ‘schemes and artifices’” in order “to allow 
prosecutors more freedom and ‘flexibility’ in pursuing fraudsters” (emphasis omitted)); 
Editorial, Prosecutors, Police Need Flexibility in Dealing with Synthetics, Idaho Press-Trib. 
(Dec. 20, 2013), https://www.idahopress.com/members/prosecutors-police-need-flexibility-
in-dealing-with-synthetics/article_f092f130-6916-11e3-a233-0019bb2963f4.html 
[https://perma.cc/3M7J-UVPK] (arguing that, rather than waiting for legislatures to designate 
particular drugs as controlled substances, statutes should instead be written more broadly 
because “law enforcement needs the flexibility”). 
168 Hessick, supra note 137, at 1152–56. 
169 See Epps, supra note 157, at 778 (“It is difficult to know exactly how often such 
prosecutorial discretion not to charge occurs—both because of the opacity of prosecutorial 
decisionmaking in general and because decisions not to act are particularly hard to measure.”). 
The prosecutor’s decision to proceed is often framed as a question of normative desirability, 
Bowers, supra note 150, at 1665–66, or “seek[ing] justice,” Epps, supra note 157, at 782. But 
what, precisely, it means to do justice, either in a particular case or in more general terms, is 
rarely elaborated upon. Id. at 782–83. 
170 For example, when the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) was repeatedly asked to clarify 
whether it would pursue federal charges against individuals who used or sold marijuana in 
states that had repealed their marijuana laws, DOJ made public a memorandum providing 
guidance to U.S. Attorneys. That memorandum set forth enforcement priorities in states that 
had repealed their marijuana prohibitions, and those priorities suggested that federal 
prosecutors would not target sellers or buyers that complied with relevant state regulations. 
But the memorandum also made clear that, whatever enforcement priorities the government 
set, federal prosecutors retained the power to fully enforce federal marijuana law and 
individuals could not rely on the memorandum as a legal defense. See Memorandum from 
James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General to All United States Attorneys (Aug. 29, 2013), 
https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf [https://perma.cc/-
5MK8-YS94]. 
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associated with common law authority. That is because common law 
crimes are subject to significant restraints. When judges exercise their 
common law power to convict for a crime that is not enshrined in statute, 
they are not simply deciding whether they think a particular defendant 
deserves punishment. Conviction is only warranted if a defendant’s 
conduct is prohibited by previous cases or by broader principles that have 
been articulated in the past.171 Those cases and principles are known in 
advance.172  
Also, although the common law sometimes relies on qualitative 
standards,173 those standards have been given content through 
adjudication. As a matter of practice, when judges have been charged with 
developing and enforcing qualitative standards, they have done so in a 
more transparent fashion. Case law articulates principles that provide 
more content to the qualitative standard, and courts often fashion rules 
that make the application of standards to particular facts more 
predictable.174 These principles and predictability provide more notice to 
individuals than entrusting enforcement of qualitative standards to the 
personal judgment of prosecutors.  
The process of common law decision-making also provides notice to 
the public about the scope of common law crimes. Any defendant who is 
convicted of a common law crime can appeal that decision. The appellate 
court will then have to decide whether the conviction was a legitimate 
exercise of common law authority, and the appellate court will explain its 
decision in a written opinion. That opinion will contain legal analysis that 
provides further information to individuals about the legality or illegality 
 
171 See Hall, supra note 32, at 46 (noting that “case-law embodies the principle of legality” 
because “there is a vast body of case-law which limits official action” and thus it “is at least 
arguable that this renders the principle of legality much more effective than does the generality 
of codes”). 
172 See Pomorski, supra note 32, at 8 (“The possibility of a conviction on the basis of a 
precedent for a common law offense . . . is not a serious violation of the principle of legality 
because the criminal character of the punished act was known earlier.”). 
173 Cf. Freund, supra note 14, at 438 (noting that some qualitative standards have “the 
sanction of common-law recognition”). For example, a common law self-defense claim 
requires a defendant to prove that she reasonably believed that force was necessary to prevent 
imminent unlawful force by another. Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law 221 (6th 
ed. 2012).  
174 For example, at common law, an intentional killing performed in “sudden heat of 
passion” as the result of “adequate provocation” would result in a conviction for manslaughter, 
rather than murder. Although “adequate provocation” seems to be a relatively open-ended 
concept, common law courts developed a list of situations that qualified as “adequate 
provocation” and situations that did not. Dressler, supra note 173, at 524–25. 
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of certain conduct. The analysis will bind that court and the relevant lower 
courts in future cases. Put differently, when judges decide cases, they are 
making law. That law helps provide clarity and predictability for future 
cases—or, in other words, it provides notice.  
In contrast to the constraints imposed by common law, prosecutorial 
decision-making in the current criminal justice system is essentially 
unconstrained. Prosecutors have no substantive constraints on their 
discretion; they are not limited by either existing cases or historical 
principles. Prosecutors are free to develop novel legal theories when 
prosecuting defendants, and they are free to pursue personal policy 
agendas in deciding the optimal scope of the criminal law.175 So long as 
prosecutors are not pursuing cases based on a defendant’s race or 
religion,176 they are free to use whatever criteria they want in setting the 
scope of criminal law. Nor does the process of enforcement create 
constraints on prosecutors. Prosecutors regularly make decisions on an ad 
hoc basis. Prosecutors are not only not required to justify their decisions, 
but current doctrine protects them from having to provide such 
justifications. There is no formal legal requirement that prosecutors act 
consistently in different cases,177 nor are there any effective practical 
mechanisms to make consistency a political requirement.178  
In sum, lack of notice is a bigger problem in the current criminal justice 
system than it is in a system of common law crimes. 
2. Democratic Accountability 
Another objection to common law authority is that it is anti-democratic 
because judges are not accountable to voters through elections.179 Unlike 
judges, legislators and prosecutors are elected, so the argument goes, and 
thus they are democratically accountable for their decisions about the 
scope of criminal law.180 
 
175 See Baughman, supra note 12, at 1092. 
176 See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) (noting that criminal laws may not be 
enforced “based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary 
classification”); see also Steven Alan Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal 
Procedure, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1365, 1372 & n.22 (1987) (collecting cases). 
177 Hessick, supra note 137, at 1150. 
178 See infra text accompanying notes 193–199. 
179 See supra note 40. 
180 One could legitimately question whether democratic accountability is necessarily a rule-
of-law value. The “rule of law” is often described as having eight different elements: 
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Before engaging with the democratic accountability objection on its 
own terms, it is important to note that the objection does not apply to most 
criminal prosecutions in this country. Although federal judges are 
appointed and enjoy life tenure, that is simply not the case for most state 
judges. The vast majority of state judges owe their seats to either direct 
elections or retention elections. As Professor Jed Shugerman has 
documented, “Almost 90 percent of state judges face some kind of 
popular election.”181  
In states where judges are subject to either direct or retention elections, 
they are more democratically accountable than federal prosecutors. U.S. 
Attorneys are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, 
but they are never required to stand for elections themselves.182 That is 
not to say that federal prosecutors are completely insulated from political 
pressure. The initial selection of federal prosecutors is indirectly 
democratic. Incoming presidents ordinarily replace U.S. Attorneys with 
 
1. Generality. Roughly, there must be rules, cognizable separately from (and broader 
than) specific cases, such that the rules can be applied to specific cases, or specific cases 
can be seen to fall under or lie within them. 
2. Notice or publicity. Those who are expected to obey the rules must be able to find 
out what the rules are. 
3. Prospectivity. The rules must exist prior in time to the actions being judged by 
them. 
4. Clarity. The rules must be understandable by those who are expected to obey them. 
5. Non-contradictoriness. Those who are expected to obey the rules must not 
simultaneously be commanded to do both A and not-A. 
6. Conformability. The addressees must be able to conform their behavior to the rules. 
7. Stability. The rules must not change so fast that they cannot be learned and 
followed. 
8. Congruence. The explicitly promulgated rules must correspond with the rules in-
ferable from patterns of enforcement by functionaries (e.g., courts and police). 
Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 781, 785 (1989); see 
also Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 209–10 (rev. ed. 1969). Democratic accountability is 
not one of those elements. And direct elections historically have not been viewed as a bulwark 
against government encroachment on liberty. E.g., The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison); 
see also Jay, Part One, supra note 37, at 1020 (noting that “it would be wrong to assume that 
‘democracy’ in our modern sense of popular control of the state was uniformly seen as the 
antidote for excessive government” during the early years of the Republic). 
181 Shugerman, supra note 146, at 3. “Nine states that select judges by gubernatorial 
appointment are Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Vermont. New York’s lower-court judges are elected, but not 
its judges on its highest court, the court of appeals. South Carolina and Virginia use legislative 
appointment.” Id. at 296 n.22. 
182 28 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2012). 
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their own nominees,183 and presidents are likely to nominate prosecutors 
who share their views. Additionally, federal prosecutors do not have life 
tenure, and so a president may fire any U.S. Attorney whose decisions 
prove to be politically unpopular.184 But despite these political checks on 
federal prosecutors, they are more insulated from direct democracy than 
judges who stand for elections. Thus, the criminal common law decisions 
of elected judges have more democratic accountability than the decisions 
of federal prosecutors. 
In addition, it is important to note that discussions about the democratic 
accountability of prosecutors ordinarily focus on the elected district 
attorney or the appointed U.S. Attorney. But these politically accountable 
actors make very few of the prosecutorial decisions discussed in this 
Article. Prosecutor offices—especially offices in large cities—are largely 
made up of line or career prosecutors.185 These are the individuals who 
make most decisions about how to enforce certain statutes and which 
individuals to prosecute—that is to say, these are the individuals who 
largely set prosecutorial policy186—and yet they are relatively insulated 
from political pressure.187 Line prosecutors usually do not turn over with 
the election or appointment of a new district attorney or U.S. Attorney, 
and they often enjoy civil service protection that shields them from firing 
for purely political reasons.188 The elected or appointed prosecutor can try 
to control some of the decisions that line prosecutors make: they can issue 
office policies or appoint supervisors on the basis of loyalty. But the 
success of these initiatives can depend on a number of factors—including 
 
183 See Dave Boyer, White House Says Firing of U.S. Attorneys Is Standard Practice, Wash. 
Times (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/mar/13/white-house-
firing-us-attorneys-standard-practice/ [https://perma.cc/FZ66-2HDH] (documenting U.S. 
Attorney turnover in recent administration changes). 
184 28 U.S.C. § 541(c) (2012) (“Each United States attorney is subject to removal by the 
President.”). 
185 Cf. Kay L. Levine & Ronald F. Wright, Prosecution in 3-D, 102 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 1119, 1136 (2012) (noting that different offices have dramatically different 
numbers of prosecutors). 
186 Cf. Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public 
Services 13–25 (1980) (explaining how “[s]treet-level bureaucrats make policy”). 
187 See Baughman, supra note 12, at 1091 (noting that “individual prosecutors retain a wide 
degree of discretion and little accountability to fulfill broader executive directives or 
guidance”).  
188 See, e.g., Nat’l Dist. Attorneys Assoc., National Prosecution Standards, No. 1-4.6, at 9 
(3d ed.) (identifying “[p]artisan activities that are legal and ethical unless those activities 
interfere with the efficient administration of the office” and “refusal to participate in partisan 
activities” as impermissible reasons to remove a line prosecutor). 
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office culture—over which the elected or appointed prosecutor has 
limited control.189 Consequently, we should not pretend as though, as a 
group, prosecutors are democratically accountable. 
Even in systems where legislators and lead prosecutors are directly 
elected but judges are not subject to elections, the democratic 
accountability objection is not quite as strong as it first seems. That is 
because the current criminal justice system does a poor job ensuring that 
legislators and prosecutors are held accountable for their policy decisions 
about substantive criminal law. Legislators are not held accountable for 
their policy decisions because they pass laws that are so broad or not 
specific enough to qualify as real policy decisions. They pass these laws 
knowing that the new laws are not really determining the scope of 
substantive criminal law; instead they are simply giving more options to 
prosecutors.190 And how prosecutors actually employ those options is 
rarely (if ever) blamed on the legislators who pass the laws.191 The current 
system allows legislators to pass the buck to prosecutors; that buck-
passing has become so routine that legislators will sometimes reference 
prosecutorial discretion as a reason not to repeal old statutes or enact new 
statutes that actually conform to voters’ policy preferences.192 That is to 
 
189 See Levine & Wright, supra note 185, at 1170–78 (documenting differences in case 
handling and case outputs based on office structure and culture). 
190 Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Federal Criminal “Code” Is a Disgrace: Obstruction Statutes as 
Case Study, 96 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 643, 646–47 (2006); William J. Stuntz, Plea 
Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2548, 2549, 2560–
62 (2004). 
191 Stuntz, supra note 145, at 548. 
192 For example, Senator Chuck Grassley opposed legislation that would have reduced 
mandatory minimum sentences, not because he disagreed with the argument that those 
sentences were disproportionately harsh, but instead because prosecutorial discretion meant 
that those penalties were not actually being imposed in all cases. He noted that: 
[J]ust under half of all drug courier offenders were subject to mandatory minimum 
sentences, but under 10 percent were subject to mandatory minimum sentences at the 
time of their sentencing. 
There are two main reasons so few of these offenders are actually sentenced to a 
mandatory minimum. The first is they may fall within the safety valve Congress has 
enacted to prevent mandatory minimum sentences from applying to low-level, first-
time drug offenders or, second, they may have provided substantial assistance to 
prosecutors in fingering high-level offenders in a drug conspiracy. 
That is an intended goal of current Federal sentencing policy, to put pressure on 
defendants to cooperate in exchange for a lower sentence so evidence against more 
responsible criminals can be attained. As a result, even for drug couriers the average 
sentence is 39 months. That seems to be an appropriate level. 
161 Cong. Rec. S963 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 2015) (statement of Sen. Grassley). 
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say, prosecutorial discretion is used as a reason for the legislature to avoid 
electoral accountability for failing to act according to democratic 
preferences. 
While legislators pass the buck to prosecutors, prosecutors simply 
avoid democratic accountability for their substantive law decisions. They 
avoid accountability because their decisions are made out of the spotlight 
and are not easily discovered by voters.193 Prosecutors rarely explain the 
general policies or criteria that they use to exercise their discretion.194 And 
the democratic process does not create pressure for them to do so. Most 
prosecutors are reelected without an opponent; and even if a prosecutor 
finds herself in a contested election, that election almost never includes 
any reference to a prosecutor’s policies.195 Prosecutors also may not 
actually possess particularly robust policies that dictate how line 
prosecutors are supposed to act.196 To the extent that line prosecutors 
make their own policy decisions, there is then no democratic 
accountability for those decisions, because line prosecutors are largely 
shielded from political pressure.197 
This is not to say that there is no democratic accountability for elected 
prosecutors. Prosecutors will occasionally find themselves voted out of 
office if they mishandle a high-profile case.198 But those high-profile 
cases are unlikely to provide much information about the general 
practices and enforcement policies of a prosecutor—and it is those 
practices and policies that are the de facto substantive criminal law in our 
current system. Indeed, prosecutors sometimes deliberately make 
 
193 See Baughman, supra note 12, at 1103–04; see also supra text accompanying notes 156–
157. 
194 See supra notes 168–170, 176–178 and accompanying text; see also Baughman, supra 
note 12, at 1086–87 (discussing how federal prosecutors were able to successfully avoid 
disclosing a manual that instructed line prosecutors on general policy). 
195 See Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 581, 
591–606 (2009). 
196 See Baughman, supra note 12, at 1091–92 (reporting that state prosecutors’ offices often 
“lack any handbook of instructions at all” and that, when surveyed, line prosecutors in the 
same prosecutor’s office disagreed about whether the office had general policies for individual 
prosecutors to follow as well as what charges to bring when given the same factual scenario). 
197 See supra notes 187–189 and accompanying text. 
198 See Wright, supra note 195, at 602 (“Sometimes the challenger criticizes the incumbent 
for an overly aggressive investigation in a newsworthy case, such as a political corruption 
investigation; or perhaps the point of contention involves the failure to bring charges in a big 
case, or the poor conduct of a trial, or a plea bargain or acquittal that disposed of the charges.”). 
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different decisions in high profile cases than in other cases which create 
incorrect public perceptions about how the law is enforced.199 
In states where judges are subject to retention or direct elections, 
common law authority in those states may actually result in more 
democratic accountability than in the current system. Unlike prosecutors, 
judges have to justify their decisions.200 The opinions in which they 
justify their decisions give voters far more information about judicial 
policy decisions than voters have about prosecutorial policies. Nor are 
judges able to avoid responsibility as legislators do, by passing the buck 
to prosecutors. Unlike legislators, judges must make decisions in 
individual cases. So, voters are able to decide which judges to vote for 
based not only on the common law crimes that judges recognize, but also 
on how they interpret and apply those crimes in individual cases. Indeed, 
there is substantial evidence that judges are responsive to electoral 
pressure and that voters hold judges responsible for their decisions in 
criminal cases.201 
In sum, the democratic accountability objection is not very strong. The 
vast majority of judges are elected, and because their decisions are 
transparent, voters have significantly more ability to act as a democratic 
check on judges than on prosecutors. And even in those jurisdictions 
where judges are not subject to periodic elections, the criminal justice 
policy decisions of legislators and prosecutors are rarely democratically 
accountable. Legislators pass their responsibility off onto prosecutors, 
and prosecutors are able to make low-visibility decisions that voters 
cannot check at the ballot box. 
3. Separation of Powers 
Some have stated that the prohibition of common law crimes is 
necessary in order to maintain the separation of powers.202 The phrase 
 
199 See Jared Chamberlain et al., Celebrities in the Courtroom: Legal Responses, Psych-
ological Theory and Empirical Research, 8 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 551, 554–58 (2006) 
(collecting evidence that high profile litigants are treated differently than ordinary litigants). 
200 As others have noted, the need to explain their decisions makes judges accountable. See, 
e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, Ambivalence and Accountability, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1571, 1574 
(1988). 
201 See, e.g., Carlos Berdejó & Noam Yuchtman, Crime, Punishment, and Politics: An 
Analysis of Political Cycles in Criminal Sentencing, 95 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 741 (2013); 
Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind When 
It Runs for Office?, 48 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 247 (2004). 
202 See supra notes 42–46. 
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“separation of powers” is often used to refer to two related but distinct 
ideas about the allocation of power in American government. The phrase 
sometimes refers to the fact that the text of the Constitution assigns 
different powers to different branches of government. The phrase 
“separation of powers” is also sometimes used to refer to the idea that the 
different branches of government serve to check and balance one 
another.203 When it comes to common law crimes, we see both of these 
ideas represented in the separation of powers critique. The separation of 
powers objection is sometimes framed as a textual argument about which 
powers the Constitution assigns to different branches. And sometimes the 
objection is framed as an argument about the optimal division of powers 
between branches in order to provide checks and balances.  
Before responding to the separation of powers objection, it is first 
worth noting that not all states have adopted the same separation of 
powers arrangements that were laid out in the federal Constitution. Some 
states have established a larger role for courts than the role specified by 
Article III.204 Thus, any argument that criminal common law authority 
violates federal separation of powers principles may not apply equally to 
state separation of powers principles. 
There is no disputing that the U.S. Constitution vests “[a]ll legislative 
Powers” in Congress and it vests the “judicial Power of the United States” 
in the Supreme Court and lower federal courts.205 The power to legislate 
includes the power to decide which conduct is legal and which conduct is 
illegal—that is, the power to write criminal laws.206 The judicial power, 
on the other hand, is widely understood to include only the power to 
interpret criminal laws as they arise in individual cases and to enter 
 
203 Some have argued that checks and balances are distinct from separation of powers theory 
because they are an “invasion” of separated powers. See Garry Wills, Explaining America: 
The Federalist 119 (1981). But more often the term “separation of powers” is thought to 
encompass both ideas—a formalist idea that different branches enjoy different powers, and a 
functionalist idea that the branches check and balance one another. See Rebecca L. Brown, 
Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1513, 1522–31 (1991) (noting 
these formalist and functionalist conceptions of separation of powers). 
204 See F. Andrew Hessick, Cases, Controversies, and Diversity, 109 Nw. U. L. Rev. 57, 65 
(2015); see also infra note 208.   
205 U.S. Const. art. I, § 1; U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. 
206 See, e.g., McMunigal, supra note 19, at 1287 (“The dominant attitude expressed in 
American jurisdictions is one of legislative supremacy and exclusivity [in criminal law].”). 
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judgments in those cases.207 Thus, the text of the Constitution seems to 
support codification rather than common law crimes.208  
But the textual argument is based on our current understanding of the 
terms “legislative powers” and “judicial power,” not the original 
understanding. The meaning of the term “judicial power” has changed 
significantly in the two centuries since the Constitution was first ratified, 
as has our understanding of the concept of separation of powers.209 When 
the Constitution was written, the meaning of the term “judicial power” 
was relatively unsettled.210 But the strong weight of the evidence indicates 
 
207 More generally, the judicial power is thought to include the power to provide remedies 
for legal wrongs, to render dispositive judgments, and to make factual and legal findings. See 
F. Andrew Hessick, Consenting to Adjudication Outside the Article III Courts, 71 Vand. L. 
Rev. 715, 719–22 (2018).  
208 Interestingly, the division of powers in the U.S. Constitution is not as strict as the division 
of powers observed in some states. See, e.g., Mass. Const. pt. 1, art. XXX (“In the government 
of this Commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and 
judicial powers, or either of them: The executive shall never exercise the legislative and 
judicial powers, or either of them: The judicial shall never exercise the legislative and 
executive powers, or either of them; to the end it may be a government of laws and not of 
men.”); Tex. Const. art. II, § 1 (“The powers of the government of the State of Texas shall be 
divided into three distinct departments, each of which shall be confined to a separate body of 
magistracy, to wit: Those which are Legislative to one, those which are Executive to another, 
and those which are Judicial to another; and no person, or collection of persons, being of one 
of these departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to either of the others, except 
in the instances herein expressly permitted.”); see also Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of 
Administrative Action 30 (1965) (noting that the U.S. Constitution, unlike some state 
constitutions, “has no clauses excluding the exercise of the power of one organ by another”).  
209 See William N. Eskridge Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial 
Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 990, 993–94 (2001) 
(explaining that, at the time the Constitution was ratified, the term “separation of powers” had 
a different meaning that “emphasiz[ed] checks and balances more than stringent separation of 
functions”). 
210 See Edward C. Eliot, The Common Law of the Federal Courts, 36 Am. L. Rev. 498, 503 
(1902) (“At the time of the adoption of the Constitution, no clear view was held by the 
members of the convention as to what its effect would be, in respect of the judicial power.”); 
Jay, Part One, supra note 37, at 1035 (noting the “highly generalized language concerning the 
role of federal courts” in Article III, the fact that “Article III came about through a process of 
known compromises” and that “few aspects of the debate (if any) on federal jurisdiction are 
documented”). Years after the Constitution was adopted, Gouverneur Morris, one of the 
delegates to the Constitutional Convention, sent a letter to Timothy Pickering about how to 
interpret the Constitution. He stated his belief that the provisions of the Constitution are “as 
clear as our language would permit; excepting, nevertheless, a part of what relates to the 
judiciary.” Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Timothy Pickering (Dec. 22, 1814), reprinted 
in 3 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 419, 420 (M. Farrand ed., 1911). He 
suggested that the ambiguity of the provisions regarding the judiciary had been phrased in 
general terms because of the “conflicting opinions [that] had been maintained” on the subject. 
Id. 
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that those who drafted and ratified the Constitution understood that term 
to encompass criminal common law authority.211 
There is significant evidence that, in the early years of the Republic, 
the “judicial power” was understood to include criminal common law 
authority.212 It is widely accepted that the Constitution was drafted and 
 
211 See, e.g., Randall Bridwell & Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitution and the Common Law: 
The Decline of the Doctrines of Separation of Powers and Federalism 35–51 (1977); 1 Julius 
Goebel, Jr., History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Antecedents and Beginnings 
to 1801, at 623–33 (Paul A. Freund, ed., 1971); Charles Grove Haines, The Role of the 
Supreme Court in American Government and Politics 1789–1835, at 125–28 (1944); Morton 
J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1780–1860, at 9–12 (1977); 1 Charles 
Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 433–37 (1922); Jay, Part One, supra note 
37; Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law (pt. 2), 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1231 (1985) 
[hereinafter Jay, Part Two]; Stephen B. Presser, A Tale of Two Judges: Richard Peters, Samuel 
Chase, and the Broken Promise of Federalist Jurisprudence, 73 Nw. U. L. Rev. 26 (1978); 
Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 Harv. L. 
Rev. 49, 73 (1923). But see Robert C. Palmer, The Federal Common Law of Crime, 4 Law & 
Hist. Rev. 267 (1986); Preyer, supra note 31; Rowe, supra note 116. 
212 There is a rich and nuanced discussion surrounding the original public meaning of the 
term “judicial power.” For example, Professors Bill Eskridge and John Manning have 
thoughtfully debated whether the term “judicial power” was understood to require judges to 
act only as faithful agents of the legislature when interpreting statutes or whether it was 
understood to permit judges to expand or narrow statutes based on considerations other than 
statutory text and legislative intent. See Eskridge, supra note 209; John F. Manning, 
Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (2001). The question of 
equitable interpretation is related to, but separate from, criminal common law authority. 
Common law authority involves the ability of judges to act in the absence of a statute, rather 
than their ability to act within the confines of a statute. While, as Manning points out, the 
evidence surrounding the question of equitable interpretation may not be conclusive, the 
evidence surrounding criminal common law authority is far more one-sided. See supra note 
211. 
It may seem odd that citizens would be more accepting of the judiciary’s ability to act in the 
absence of any statutory authority than their ability to exercise broad personal judgment within 
the confines of a statute. That is because the modern discussion about judicial power is one 
about constraint of judges’ personal policy preferences. But, at the time of the Founding, 
citizens would not have necessarily thought that common law authority—that is, the ability of 
judges to convict in the absence of a statute—entailed less constraint than equitable 
interpretation. For one thing, common law authority was viewed as constrained by historical 
common law or natural common law. See supra notes 55–56, 171–173 and accompanying 
text. For another, there was broad agreement that Parliament had the ability to displace 
common law through statutes. See 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of 
England 160 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 3d ed. 1768). Indeed, the idea that the courts have 
more authority to act in the absence of legislation has endured. See Eliot, supra note 210, at 
500 (observing that in a “class of cases which fall beyond State control, and which have not 
been touched by Congressional action, the Federal courts enforce a ‘common law’”). Modern 
examples of this principle can be found in the areas of maritime law, punitive damages, Bivens 
actions, and equitable injunctions. 
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ratified against a backdrop of English common law principles.213 And 
historical practice appears to confirm that the judicial power included the 
power to recognize and convict for common law crimes. In the years 
immediately following ratification of the Constitution, there were a 
number of federal prosecutions brought in the absence of federal criminal 
statutes. Statutes were considered unnecessary because certain actions 
were understood to be illegal as a matter of substantive common law. 
Common law prosecutions were brought for bribery, counterfeiting, and 
piracy.214 And despite the fact that these actions had not been explicitly 
forbidden by Congress, those prosecutions appear to have been accepted 
as a matter of course.215 Judges routinely instructed grand juries and petit 
juries on common law crimes. Justice Story wrote in 1816 that “excepting 
Judge Chase, every Judge that ever sat on the Supreme Court Bench, from 
the adoption of the Constitution until 1804” held the opinion that “the 
Courts of the United States have from their very organization a general 
 
213 See, e.g., Jay, Part One, supra note 37, at 1033 n.138 (noting that “[m]any provisions of 
the Constitution employed common-law terms, and common-law principles were expected to 
provide guidance, as is indicated by various statements made during the ratification process,” 
and collecting sources); Ann Woolhandler, Public Rights, Private Rights, and Statutory 
Retroactivity, 94 Geo. L.J. 1015, 1062 (2006) (noting that “[t]he Constitution . . . was written 
against a backdrop of . . . traditional common law interests”); see also Stephen E. Sachs, 
Constitutional Backdrops, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1813, 1836–37 (2012) (suggesting that the 
Constitution is best understood as having been ratified against a “backdrop” of unwritten 
common law rules). 
To be sure, in establishing a republic, the Founders and the public were necessarily rejecting 
some aspects of the English system. But criminal common law authority is not obviously tied 
to those aspects of the English system that the colonies rejected, such as the infallibility of the 
Crown. But see Jay, Part One, supra note 37, at 1087 (noting that, during the partisan fighting 
over federal criminal common law, some common law opponents argued that common law 
authority was “making Americans once again subjects of Great Britain by applying its 
common law.”). 
214 See Jay, Part One, supra note 37, at 1039–42, 1063–64 (providing accounts of federal 
common law prosecutions in 1790–1794); id. at 1064 n.306 (describing a 1797 common law 
counterfeiting prosecution “that seems to have provoked little public outcry”); id. at 1073 
(identifying several common law prosecutions for neutrality violations and for treason in the 
mid- to late 1790s); Preyer, supra note 31, at 229–31 (describing early American common law 
prosecutions). 
215 As Professor Stewart Jay notes, only Justice Iredell appears to have originally rejected 
federal common law authority; but he subsequently endorsed federal non-statutory 
prosecutions. Jay, Part One, supra note 37, at 1041, 1053–54. But see Preyer, supra note 31, 
at 231 (arguing that the evidence “is hardly conclusive for the position that there was a widely 
shared view among the early federal judges supportive of a federal common law of crimes”). 
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common law jurisdiction” over crimes that violate the sovereignty of the 
United States.216 
Judges were not the only early federal officials to endorse federal 
common law prosecutions. As Professor Stewart Jay documents in his 
exhaustive history of the origins of federal common law, the prosecution 
of Gideon Henfield and John Singleton prompted the majority of the men 
who we now refer to as “Founding Fathers” to take the position—some 
more publicly than others—that criminal common law prosecutions were 
permitted. Henfield and Singleton were indicted for violating the 
neutrality of the United States in the war between England and France, a 
crime for which there was no congressional statute, but ample common 
law authority. A 1793 formal opinion of Attorney General Edmund 
Randolph for then-Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson made clear the 
Washington administration’s position that Henfield “is indictable at the 
common law, because his conduct comes within the description of 
disturbing the peace of the United States.”217 As Professor Jay recounts, 
Randolph, Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay all approved of 
the prosecution, which was grounded in the common law rather than in 
statute.218 
This apparent consensus that federal prosecutions could be brought in 
the absence of a federal statute was, however, short-lived. The consensus 
was undermined by the fact that common law prosecutions became a 
weapon in the partisan battles between the Federalists and the 
Republicans. Federalist judges used their common law authority to 
convict Republicans in federal (and some state) courts, and Republican 
state judges used their common law authority to convict Federalists in the 
 
216 1 Life and Letters of Joseph Story, supra note 57, at 299. Three of the Justices who 
endorsed criminal common law authority served as delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention. Jay, Part One, supra note 37, at 1016 (identifying Justices Wilson, Ellsworth, and 
Patterson). 
217 Jay, Part One, supra note 37, at 1048. 
218 Id. at 1053. As Jay notes, John Marshall:  
avoided reaching the question of the precise scope of federal common-law 
jurisdiction. . . . Marshall, and other Federalists, never had the ambition to claim that 
federal courts had the full jurisdiction of the central courts of England. At the same 
time, for any case within federal jurisdiction, Marshall would draw extensively upon 
common-law principles. He evidently thought that section 11 of the 1789 Judiciary Act 
authorized a common-law jurisdiction for criminal cases.  
Jay, Part Two, supra note 211, at 1333. 
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state courts.219 As a consequence, federal criminal common law authority 
became inextricably bound up with those partisan positions.220 Limiting 
the common law authority of federal judges became a Republican cause. 
Jefferson and Randolph, who had supported criminal common law 
authority in the Henfield prosecution, turned against it.221 Republicans 
eventually gained control of federal offices, including the Supreme Court. 
And as a result of that political victory,222 in 1812 the Supreme Court 
declared that federal courts had no criminal common law authority in 
United States v. Hudson & Goodwin.223  
The fact that federal common law authority was short-lived does not 
change the fact that criminal common law authority was initially 
 
219 As Stewart Jay has documented, the controversy over federal common law authority was 
prompted by “the use of these prosecutions for political purposes during . . . the close of the 
[1790s].” Jay, Part One, supra note 37, at 1112; see also id. at 1031 (noting that 
“Federalists . . . [took] such measures as bringing treason charges, prosecuting for the 
common-law offenses of sedition and violating neutrality, and enacting the despised Alien and 
Sedition Acts”); id. at 1066 (describing the common law criminal libel prosecution of a 
Federalist by Republicans in Pennsylvania state court); id. at 1075 (noting that, prior to the 
passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts, “Federalists had been bringing sedition prosecutions 
at common law for several years, both in federal and state courts, against well-known 
Republican editors, causing the demise of a number of publications”); id. at 1076 (noting that, 
“when he became President, Jefferson suggested the use of state criminal libel prosecutions 
against Federalist editors for personal attacks on him”). 
220 See Preyer, supra note 31, at 242 (emphasizing that, when it came to the question of 
federal criminal common law “political combat merged with the legal issue”); Rowe, supra 
note 116, at 936 (“The Jeffersonian understanding of the Constitution, which Justice Johnson 
summarily articulated in Hudson, was forged in the furnace of the Sedition Act.”). This is not 
to say that the issue of criminal common law authority for the federal courts “was purely a 
creature of partisan politics.” Jay, Part One, supra note 37, at 1033 (emphasis added). But the 
partisan fight over the matter is crucial to understanding how the consensus over the matter 
appears to have collapsed less than two decades into the Republic, and that the authority was 
disavowed by the Supreme Court in 1812. 
221 See Jay, Part One, supra note 37, at 1091–93; see also 2 William Winslow Crosskey, 
Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States 763 n.* (1953) (noting 
Jefferson’s initial support and subsequent rejection of federal common law power and stating 
that his subsequent change of heart was “new and unjustified”). 
222 See 2 Crosskey, supra note 221, at 766 (claiming that “the evidence indicates that 
Jefferson and certain of his henchmen had carefully contrived this case to present this issue, 
and carefully held it back till they controlled the Court”); Jay, Part One, supra note 37, at 1014 
n.38 (noting the “series of unusual postponements in the case” as offering “some evidence that 
the proceedings were delayed until the Republicans had a safe majority on the Supreme 
Court”); Preyer, supra note 31, at 247 (noting that, when Hudson & Goodwin “was finally 
decided in March 1812,” the “Supreme Court . . . had, for the first time, a Republican 
majority”). 
223 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (holding that the “exercise of criminal jurisdiction in 
common law cases” is “not within the[] implied powers” of the federal courts). 
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understood to have been assigned to the judicial branch by the 
Constitution. 224 The idea that criminal common law authority fell outside 
of the judicial power developed over the course of a struggle between 
Federalists and Republicans. And it was not until after ratification, when 
those parties were firmly entrenched, that criminal common law authority 
began to be viewed as an impermissible intrusion by the judiciary on the 
legislative power.225 
That criminal common law authority was rejected within thirty years 
after the Constitution was ratified may, however, indicate that authority 
over the content of criminal law should not be assigned to the judiciary. 
That is to say, the fact that criminal common law authority was so quickly 
rejected may be evidence that common law authority is incompatible with 
our system of divided government. This is the second separation of 
powers argument—an argument that the power to write the criminal laws 
should be separated from the power to interpret those laws and that those 
powers should be assigned to different branches. 
 
224 When discussing equitable interpretation, rather than common law crimes, John Manning 
appears to have suggested that the original understanding of the term “judicial power” may 
actually be better understood using later rather than earlier cases. In particular, he suggests 
that cases from the Marshall Court, rather than earlier cases, give us greater insight into the 
original understanding of “judicial power.” 
In a new system of government with a largely uncharted legal tradition, judges would 
naturally seek interpretive principles in the most familiar sources of authority, namely 
English treatises and case law. Hence, largely unelaborated invocations of the equity of 
the statute in the earliest days of the republic may reflect a predictable reliance on 
English sources in a new legal system, rather than an affirmative judgment that the 
federal judges, in our distinctive constitutional system, inherited the same broad 
lawmaking powers that their English forebears had enjoyed. 
Manning, supra note 212, at 89. 
It is uncontroversial that later cases may reflect a better understanding of the meaning of 
the Constitution. After all, the common law process allows judges and litigants to refine 
principles and arguments over time. And that refinement likely includes more nuanced 
interpretation of constitutional terms that fit more logically within the broader structure of the 
Constitution. But whether a later case includes a better understanding of a constitutional term 
does not tell us whether that was the original understanding. To the contrary, there is ample 
reason to believe that those who wrote and ratified the Constitution would have also relied on 
those same “familiar sources of authority” for their understanding of the meaning of 
constitutional terms. What is more, given that the scope of judicial power became part of a 
partisan controversy in the decades after the Founding, see supra notes 219–220, it seems quite 
likely that the understanding of the term changed after ratification. 
225 As Professor Stewart Jay documents, it was during the debates over the Judiciary Act of 
1801 that “Republicans began to raise with increasing clarity separation of powers 
concerns. . . . [T]he Republicans warned that ‘this adopting the common law is only another 
name for legislation.’” Jay, Part One, supra note 37, at 1104 (quoting 11 Annals of Cong. 713 
(1802) (statement of Rep. Macon)). 
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The separation of powers between different branches is assumed to 
promote individual liberty because government abuse is less likely when 
all three branches must agree.226 In the context of criminal law, the 
branches must agree that conduct is deserving of punishment in order for 
a defendant to be convicted. If the legislature does not believe certain 
conduct should be punished, then it will exclude the conduct from its 
definition of crimes. If the prosecutor does not believe that the particular 
circumstances of a case warrant punishment, then she will decline to bring 
charges in a particular case. And the judiciary will dismiss charges 
brought by prosecutors unless a defendant’s conduct is clearly prohibited 
by the criminal statute.227 The jury also serves as a check on government 
power, not only because it will acquit if the prosecutor fails to carry her 
burden of proof, but also because it has the power to nullify—that is, 
acquit against the weight of the evidence—in cases where a prosecution 
appears unjust or unwarranted.228  
Those who believe that common law crimes fail to strike an optimal 
balance of power between the branches appear to object to the courts’ 
encroachment on the legislature’s power to write the law.229 After all, 
when employing their common law authority, judges are both deciding 
that conduct is criminal and interpreting whether a particular defendant’s 
conduct meets the threshold in a particular case. But these concerns about 
encroachment are likely overstated. For one thing, both prosecutors and 
juries continue to act as a check on judges. Judges cannot convict unless 
prosecutors bring charges, and juries have been known to acquit because 
they did not agree with a judge’s instructions about the scope of the 
 
226 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 222 (2011); Jaffe, supra note 208, at 32; 
Barkow, supra note 147, at 871. 
227 See Baughman, supra note 12, at 1083–84 (articulating these constitutional checks and 
noting that they have, at times, been underenforced).  
228 See Laura I. Appleman, The Lost Meaning of the Jury Trial Right, 84 Ind. L.J. 397, 409–
17 (2009) (describing the historical view of the jury right as ensuring “the local community 
was able to both create and control the content of . . . substantive law” and that the jury 
functioned as “a popular bulwark against government and sovereign oppression”); Anne 
Bowen Poulin, The Jury: The Criminal Justice System’s Different Voice, 62 U. Cin. L. Rev. 
1377, 1400 (1994) (“The jury’s power to nullify provides an accommodation between the 
rigidity of the law and the need to hear and respond to positions that do not fit legal 
pigeonholes, such as claims of spousal abuse before the battered-spouse syndrome received 
acceptance.”); see also Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004) (“Just as suffrage 
ensures the people’s ultimate control in the legislative and executive branches, jury trial is 
meant to ensure their control in the judiciary.”). 
229 See supra note 42. 
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criminal law.230 For another, judges’ common law authority is not 
unlimited; it is constrained by existing common law—i.e., previously 
decided cases and principles.231 Legislatures do not have similar 
constraints on their ability to criminalize behavior, so long as the criminal 
laws do not prohibit otherwise constitutionally protected behavior.232 
But even though common law crimes allow judges to perform more 
than one function, that does not mean they provide fewer checks and 
balances than codification. The current codification system does a poor 
job involving all three branches in a case and thus in protecting individual 
liberty.233 Instead, the prosecutor is extraordinarily powerful—possessing 
the power not only to enforce the laws, but also the power to largely 
determine the scope of the substantive law and the power to obtain 
convictions while avoiding adjudication in the courts.234 
As discussed above, the legislature has written laws that delegate the 
scope of the criminal law to prosecutors.235 Not only have the legislature 
and the executive failed to check each other, their actions have also served 
to weaken—and in some cases, eliminate—the ability of the judiciary to 
act as a check.236 The rise in guilty pleas and the decline of trials is directly 
attributable to the collaboration of legislatures and prosecutors. 
 
230 See Harry Kalven, Jr. & Hans Zeisel, The American Jury 58, 116 (1966) (reporting on 
jury nullification). 
231 See supra text accompanying notes 171–174. 
232 As Professor Darryl Brown has explained: 
[I]n the modern era, legislatures create crimes, and legislatures do not abide by a 
consistent set of principles regarding what matters are appropriate for criminalization. 
They employ criminal law purely instrumentally, as a tool for achieving whatever end 
majorities choose to pursue. More interestingly, courts have never developed 
significant constitutional doctrines for checking legislatures’ crime-creation choices, 
even as they developed a range of doctrines to review legislative action in any number 
of other topics, and in the process of regulating other topics—speech, privacy rights, 
property and contract rights, rights to fair notice, weapons possession—they have 
overturned hundreds of criminal laws. 
Darryl K. Brown, Can Criminal Law Be Controlled? 108 Mich. L. Rev. 971, 972 (2010).  
233 See Barkow, supra note 147, at 871–73 (stating that the prosecutors’ combination of 
powers “can lead to gross abuses,” that “the combination of law enforcement and adjudicative 
power in a single prosecutor is the most significant design flaw in the federal criminal system,” 
and that “judicial and legislative oversight has failed to correct this power grab by 
prosecutors”). 
234 Id. at 876–77 (“[A] prosecutor’s decision about what charges to bring and what plea to 
accept amounts to a final adjudication in most criminal cases.”). 
235 See supra text accompanying notes 151–155. 
236 See Stuntz, supra note 145, at 528 (“[P]rosecutorial and legislative power reinforce each 
other, and together both these powers push courts to the periphery.”). 
COPYRIGHT © 2019 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 
1016 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 105:965 
Legislatures pass overlapping statutes and statutes with harsh penalties. 
These statutes, in connection with the lack of judicial oversight over 
prosecutorial discretion and plea bargaining, ensure that defendants plead 
guilty rather than insisting on trial.  
The elimination of trials has also removed juries as a check on 
substantive criminal law in individual cases. When a criminal case 
proceeds to trial, the jury serves not only as a fact-finder; it also serves as 
a democratic check on government actors’ decisions to prosecute.237 If, 
for example, a prosecutor brings a case under a statute involving a 
qualitative standard, the jury will acquit unless it agrees with the 
prosecutor’s judgment that the defendant acted unreasonably. Eliminating 
juries removes them as a check on the scope of criminal statutes, and it 
also removes them as a check through nullification.238 
To be clear, the judges are at least partially responsible for their greatly 
diminished role in criminal prosecutions. They have refused to place 
limits on the plea-bargaining process, and they routinely “rubber stamp 
cooperation, charging, and plea decisions.”239 In addition to their failures 
to check plea bargaining, judges have also been less active in interpreting 
criminal laws than other statutes. Judges could, for example, choose to 
interpret statutes at the beginning of a criminal case, before most 
defendants decide whether to plead guilty. This is the current practice in 
the civil system, in which judges routinely construe statutes when 
deciding a motion to dismiss.240 
In embracing their role as mere interpreters of statutes, and in taking 
up that task largely after conviction, modern judges largely eschew their 
ability to narrow the scope of the criminal law. Historically, judges 
construed criminal statutes narrowly, thus helping to preserve individual 
liberty.241 Current trends in judicial methodology and ideology have made 
the judiciary less able to check the expansion of criminal power.242 
 
237 See supra note 228. 
238 See generally Appleman, supra note 228. 
239 Barkow, supra note 147, at 872.  
240 Gold et al., supra note 148, at 1632–33, 1640–44. 
241 Eskridge, supra note 209, at 1005; Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of 
Structure, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 885, 896–99 (2004). 
242 See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick, Corpus Linguistics and the Criminal Law, 2017 BYU 
L. Rev. 1503, 1506, 1514, 1526 (2017) (noting how textualists will often rely on conclusions 
about “ordinary meaning” in interpreting statutes rather than canons of statutory construction 
that promote notice and accountability); Price, supra note 241, at 886, 899, 912–21 (arguing 
that modern decisions that deemphasize the rule of lenity have decreased democratic 
accountability and separation of powers). 
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Textualism in particular—which asks only whether government action is 
supported by the text of a statute—is particularly ill-suited to ensuring 
that legislators and prosecutors are held responsible for their decisions to 
increase the scope of criminal law.243  
Common law authority provides more checks and balances than the 
current codification system because it involves all three branches. Judges 
are not able to initiate prosecutions on their own; they still need 
prosecutors to bring charges against specific individuals. Nor do judges 
have exclusive authority over the scope of criminal law. The legislature 
has the ability to overrule any common law decision.244 If a judge deems 
certain conduct criminal as a matter of common law, that judgment can 
be overturned by the legislature—even retroactively. And if a judge 
decides certain behavior is permitted, the legislature could criminalize it 
prospectively. 
In sum, the separation of powers objection does not suggest that our 
current system of codification is superior to the criminal common law. 
The text of the Constitution does not forbid common law crimes, and 
common law crimes are better suited to ensuring the participation of all 
three branches, thus protecting individual liberty. 
4. Discretion and the Potential for Abuse 
Some have argued that common law authority affords judges greater 
discretion than they have under a system of statutes and with that 
discretion comes the potential for abuse.245 Because judges make the 
decision whether certain conduct is a crime in the context of an individual 
case, so the argument goes, they may make those decisions on the basis 
of a particular defendant’s race, religion, or other irrelevant individual 
characteristics. In contrast, statutes are generally applicable. While they 
may be inspired by a particular crime or set of crimes, the legislature’s 
decision whether to classify particular conduct as criminal is always 
forward-looking. 
 
243 See Price, supra note 241, at 911–13 (arguing that a more robust rule of lenity would 
provide greater accountability for legislators and executive officials than does our current 
system). 
244 See 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 160 (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 3d ed. 1768); see also Philip Hamburger, The Inversion of Rights and Power, 
63 Buff. L. Rev. 731, 745 (2015) (discussing Parliament’s absolute power). 
245 See supra notes 47–48. 
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The discretion argument does not stand up to serious scrutiny. While 
the text of a statute may leave no room for the consideration of personal 
characteristics, its enforcement certainly does. Qualitative standards, 
undefined terms, and overly broad statutes delegate significant discretion 
to prosecutors—more discretion than what is given to judges by common 
law crimes.246 Prosecutors are just as likely to be influenced by a 
defendant’s personal characteristics as are judges. Indeed, because 
prosecutors, unlike judges, are not bound by their past decisions, 
prosecutors may be more likely to allow race, religion, or other 
unacceptable factors to drive their decisions.247 There is a robust literature 
demonstrating that police and prosecutors are more likely to arrest, 
prosecute, and seek harsh sentences for defendants who are poor or who 
are members of racial minorities.248  
As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 
“[t]here is no doubt that the breadth of discretion that our country’s legal 
system vests in prosecuting attorneys carries with it the potential for both 
individual and institutional abuse.”249 As then-Attorney General Robert 
Jackson explained, sprawling criminal codes allow prosecutors to pursue 
charges against anyone they choose: 
 With the law books filled with a great assortment of crimes, a 
prosecutor stands a fair chance of finding at least a technical violation 
of some act on the part of almost anyone. In such a case, it is not a 
question of discovering the commission of a crime and then looking for 
the man who has committed it, it is a question of picking the man and 
 
246 Hessick, supra note 137, at 1156–59. 
247 See Baughman, supra note 12, at 1092. 
248 E.g., David A. Harris, Profiles in Injustice: Why Racial Profiling Cannot Work 10–12 
(2002); Charles Crawford et al., Race, Racial Threat, and Sentencing of Habitual Offenders, 
36 Criminology 481, 481–82, 503 (1998); Jill Farrell, Mandatory Minimum Firearm Penalties: 
A Source of Sentencing Disparity?, Just. Res. & Pol’y, June 2003, at 95, 98–99, 103–04, 110–
12; Cassia Spohn et al., The Impact of the Ethnicity and Gender of Defendants on the Decision 
to Reject or Dismiss Felony Charges, 25 Criminology 175, 175–76, 186 (1987); Sonja B. Starr 
& M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing the Role of 
Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 Yale L.J. 2, 28–29 (2013); Jeffrey T. Ulmer et al., 
Prosecutorial Discretion and the Imposition of Mandatory Minimum Sentences, 44 J. Res. 
Crime & Delinq. 427, 450–52 (2007).  
249 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978). 
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then searching the law books, or putting investigators to work, to pin 
some offense on him.250 
Professor John Jeffries has argued that statutes may be better at 
preventing abuse than the common law because of the limits they place 
on the executive. Jeffries acknowledges that the greater threat of abuse 
comes from law enforcement, rather than from judges.251 The courts’ need 
to justify their decisions and the creation of precedent impose “important 
constraints on abuse of discretion in the judicial process.”252 But Jeffries 
nonetheless sees common law authority as creating an unacceptable risk 
of abuse because it invites abuse by law enforcement. Jeffries explains: 
The law remains entirely open-ended. No doubt some applications are 
predictable, but others are open to speculation. And the incentive to 
speculate rests, first and most important, with the agencies of law 
enforcement. Viewed from their perspective, [common law authority] 
is a continuing invitation to vindicate their own notions of appropriate 
social control by criminal arrest and prosecution.253  
In other words, common law authority exacerbates abuse by police and 
prosecutors.  
It is unclear whether common law authority invites more abuse by 
police and prosecutors than does our current system of qualitative 
standards, undefined terms, and overly broad statutes. That is an empirical 
question that may be impossible to test. But there is little doubt that 
qualitative standards, undefined terms, and overly broad statutes also 
invite abuse.  
What is more, current institutional dynamics allow prosecutors to 
obtain guilty pleas from defendants even when the criminal statutes are 
clearly worded and the defendants’ behavior falls outside of the statutory 
language. Take, for example, the case of Evan Emory.254 Emory filmed 
himself singing innocuous songs to students at a local school. He then 
altered the video to make it appear as though he was singing songs with 
 
250 Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 Am. Inst. Crim. L. & Criminology 3, 5 
(1940). 
251 Jeffries, supra note 32, at 215 (“[T]he chief locus of concern is not the courts, but the 
police and prosecutors.”). 
252 Id. at 214. 
253 Id. at 226. 
254 Erica Goode, Michigan Town Split on Child Pornography Charges, N.Y. Times (Mar. 7, 
2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/08/us/08muskegon.html? [https://perma.cc/MJA2-
H8T9]. 
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graphic sexual lyrics and that the children were laughing and enjoying the 
songs. After Emory posted the altered video on YouTube, the county 
prosecutor charged Emory with manufacturing and distributing child 
pornography, crimes that carry a maximum punishment of 20 years’ 
imprisonment. Emory’s conduct fell well outside of the child 
pornography statutory language,255 but he negotiated a plea to lesser 
charges in order to avoid the risk of conviction at trial.256 
So even assuming that Jeffries is correct, and that common law 
authority encourages abuse by law enforcement, it is unlikely that such 
abuse would be worse than the current codification system. In a system 
where penalties are so harsh that defendants cannot risk trial, prosecutors 
can unilaterally decide what conduct should be punished. Plea bargaining 
deprives judges of the ability to check those decisions. At least the 
common law system requires both prosecutors and judges to agree that 
punishment was warranted. The current system requires only prosecutors 
to reach that judgement because the system’s high penalties ensure that 
defendants will not seek a trial. And the leverage that the current system 
has given prosecutors in order to secure plea bargains is sometimes so 
high that it allows prosecutors, as in the case of Evan Emory, to expand 
the scope of the criminal law to reach conduct that plainly falls outside of 
the scope of a clearly written statute. 
5. Uniformity and Deterrence 
Some argue that, because common law crimes have not been reduced 
to a specific, defined set of circumstances, the outcomes of criminal cases 
are less likely to be uniform and illegal conduct is less likely to be 
deterred.257 Neither of these arguments stands up to scrutiny. 
The uniformity argument rests on the assumption that statutes 
necessarily reduce crime definitions to a specific, defined set of 
circumstances. But that is simply not true.258 Statutes that contain 
qualitative standards or undefined terms also fail to articulate the specific, 
 
255 The statute requires either filming a child in a sexual activity or making it appear that a 
child is engaging in that activity. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.145c (2019). Emory did neither. 
Laughing—even laughing at a sexually explicit song—is not, in any sense of the term, sexual 
activity. 
256 See Erica Goode, Crime & Punishment in YouTube Generation, Hous. Chron., Mar. 13, 
2011, at A23. 
257 See supra notes 49–50. 
258 See Pomorski, supra note 32, at 9 (observing that “in a great [many]” jurisdictions “the 
wording of the criminal statutes is as vague as the common law doctrines”). 
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defined set of circumstances that are illegal. And just as the constraints of 
the common law methodology give more notice to defendants than does 
the current system,259 so too is the application of criminal law likely to be 
more uniform than in the current system.260 Judges must articulate the 
reasons for using or declining to use a particular common law doctrine, 
those decisions are subject to appeal, and those appeals give rise to 
binding precedent.261 In contrast, prosecutors need not articulate the 
reasons for their decisions, those decisions are not reviewable, and the 
decisions made in one case do not constrain their decisions in subsequent 
cases. 
The argument that common law crimes undermine deterrence is also 
not particularly strong. Because common law crimes are “generally 
unknown to the public,”262 so the argument goes, they cannot “deter future 
offenders through fear of punishment.”263 This deterrence argument, 
though often repeated by criminal-law scholars,264 ought not be taken at 
face value. The argument appears to rely on the assumption that 
individuals will not know the content of common law crimes unless they 
read all of the judicial decisions from criminal cases, whereas they could 
learn the content of statutory crimes by merely consulting the criminal 
code.265 But the idea that individuals could read and understand every 
crime in a jurisdiction’s criminal code is laughable.266 In fact, if you factor 
in scope and stability, people are probably more likely to know the content 
of criminal common law than criminal statutes. There are only a small 
number of common law crimes, which have remained relatively stable 
over time; in contrast, there are a vast number of criminal statutes, which 
can be enacted or repealed at any time based on legislative whim.267 What 
is more, accessibility of crime definitions depends on circumstances other 
than existence of the common law authority. For example, the availability 
 
259 See supra Subsection III.B.1. 
260 See Rosenberg, supra note 31, at 194 (arguing that common law crimes “may bring 
uniformity and clarity in some instances where statutes fail to do so”). 
261 See Jeffries, supra note 32, at 214.  
262 Robinson, supra note 47, at 340. 
263 1 LaFave, supra note 3, § 2.1(f), at 118.  
264 See supra note 50. 
265 See Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: 
The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 681, 682 (1983) (“Only a precise, 
principled code that sufficiently defines forbidden conduct can achieve its goals of 
condemnation and deterrence.”). 
266 Jeffries, supra note 32, at 210–11; Roth, supra note 144, at 176. 
267 See supra text accompanying notes 231–232. 
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of high-quality treatises can make the common law more accessible than 
criminal codes,268 whereas the failure to compile and formally codify 
legislatively enacted crimes can make statutory crimes inaccessible.269 
Notably, the deterrence argument ignores the fact that, in our current 
system, the meaning of a criminal statute incorporates relevant case 
law.270 Take, for example, the federal statute that prohibits fraud in the 
sale of securities.271 Any person reading that statute would not know that 
it also prohibits insider trading unless they also had read the relevant court 
opinions.272 So, to the extent that knowledge of case law undermines 
deterrence, deterrence is also a problem for many statutory crimes. 
In sum, common law crimes do not appear to be any less effective at 
ensuring uniformity or deterrence than our current codification system, 
and in some instances common law crimes may be better. 
CONCLUSION 
The conventional wisdom surrounding common law crimes is untrue. 
Criminal statutes have not fully displaced common law crimes, and to the 
extent that codification has supplanted common law crimes, it has often 
 
268 Indeed, the publication of newer common law treatises appears to have quieted calls for 
codification earlier in American history. See Charles M. Cook, The American Codification 
Movement: A Study of Antebellum Legal Reform 206 (1981). 
269 See Roth, supra note 144, at 176 (“Although most federal crimes are set forth in Title 18 
of the U.S. Code, a significant number of federal crimes are also scattered throughout other 
titles. No one has been able to come up with a reliable count of the number of federal crimes 
that are on the books, which is a strong indication that something is seriously amiss.”); see 
also Cook, supra note 268, at 6–8 (recounting that, in early America, statutes were rarely 
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of the Province of New Jersey, at iii (Burlington, Samuel Allinson 1776)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
270 Pomorski, supra note 32, at 3 (“The judicial construction of a statute incorporated in a 
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271 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1934) (prohibiting the use, “in connection with the purchase or sale 
of any security,” of “any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of 
such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange Commission] may prescribe”); 17 
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018) (forbidding the use, “in connection with the sale or purchase of any 
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business which operates . . . as a fraud or deceit”). 
272 See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997) (explaining why 
trading on inside information “qualifies as a ‘deceptive device’ under § 10(b)”); see also supra 
text accompanying notes 88–96. 
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failed to vindicate rule-of-law values. Despite its falsity, the conventional 
wisdom is routinely taught to students,273 repeated in court opinions,274 
and embraced in the academic literature.275 
The conventional wisdom is not only wrong, it is also pernicious. The 
descriptive claim validates the idea that judges ought to have no role in 
shaping the content of the law. In this respect, the descriptive claim 
reinforces the tendency of modern judges to defer unconditionally to 
legislatures’ and prosecutors’ decisions about the scope of criminal 
law.276 The normative claim helps to cement that unconditional deference. 
It tells judges that, if they take too active of a role in shaping the content 
of criminal law, then they risk undermining important rule-of-law values. 
But, in reality, judges’ deference to prosecutors and refusal to check 
legislative excess is a far greater threat to the rule of law. 
Any reasonably informed observer of the modern American criminal 
justice system will tell you that it is in desperate need of reform. Our laws 
are too harsh, defendants are routinely convicted and sentenced without 
important procedural protections, law enforcement and prosecutors 
unfairly target poor and minority communities, and we incarcerate a 
larger percentage of our population than does any other country in the 
world.277 Given these realities, I do not think that it is a coincidence that 
 
273 E.g., Dix & Sharlot, supra note 22, at 172; Johnson, supra note 22, at 75; Kadish et al., 
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the story we tell ourselves about how our criminal law developed and the 
values that it embodies is false. Perhaps if we can recognize that this story 
is false—if we can recognize that the “bad old days,” when common law 
crimes were the norm and criminal statutes were the exception, were 
actually more protective of individual rights and better able to check 
government abuse than our current system—then perhaps we can finally 
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